




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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**



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# East Europe

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Jakes Talks About His Life-Style, Political Downfall

90EC0228A Prague ZEMEDELSE NOVINY in Czech  
11 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Milos Jakes, former CPCZ general secretary, by Jan Subert: "The Czechoslovak Communist Party Did Not Know How To Conduct a Normal Political Struggle—Three Hours With Milos Jakes"; date of interview not given; first paragraph is ZEMEDELSE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] The house in one of the quiet streets close to Prague's Hanspaulka is well maintained but does not attract attention. There was never a 'no standing or parking' sign along the sidewalk, nor was there on the opposite side, or anywhere in the vicinity, a covert or open place for members of the armed guard. Behind the ordinary fence are small but carefully cleared and well attended gardens where the neighbors' lawns begin. The street is so narrow that I have to park my Rapid halfway on the sidewalk. It stands several centimeters behind a white Lada which, like the house, belongs to the former general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, Milos Jakes. We are sitting in the entry room and our conversation continues.

[ZEMEDELSE NOVINY] How long have you lived here?

[Jakes] Since 1972. Before that my wife and I, two sons, a daughter-in-law and three-year-old granddaughter lived in a three-room apartment in Vrsovice. In 1970 I became sick, tuberculosis was suspected and for 3 months I lay in a sanatorium in Dobris. When I returned the doctors told me that I had to sleep alone in a separate room. As chance would have it, an acquaintance told me that he knew of a house selling for 150,000. I did not have much money so I had to borrow, also for necessary repairs.

[ZEMEDELSE NOVINY] Who paid for the operation and maintenance of the house during the time that you were the general secretary?

[Jakes] I paid everything myself, from my salary. Only last summer I painted the eaves. I am lucky that I don't suffer from dizziness and for all my 67 years I can clamber over the roof.

[ZEMEDELSE NOVINY] If I had come a few months earlier would I have found a gardener, servant or housekeeper here?

[Jakes] Yes, but only in the person of my wife. Not long ago she was washing windows, fell off the ladder and broke some ribs. And she also was fined on my account because I had not cleared the snow off the sidewalk. The inspector of public order, without knowing who lived in

the house, quite properly expected the owner to carry out his obligations the same as any other citizen.

[ZEMEDELSE NOVINY] Didn't you get an offer to move to a government or party villa?

[Jakes] They wanted me, as general secretary, to move to a villa in Troja where Husak lived before he became president. Living there, of course, includes a whole allowance. When I declined they pointed out that there would be problems of protection. They said they would have to set up some kind of guard post in the vicinity of my house. I was basically against it, so they finally hit on a compromise. About 300 meters from our house there is a former party hotel where there was a permanent security service. And so they installed a direct phone line for me to their desk.

[ZEMEDELSE NOVINY] You do not have to answer my next question. What is the extent of your property at this time?

[Jakes] The house in which we are sitting, a small prefabricated Yveta vacation house which I put up in 1962 at Orlik and part of a cottage, a former gamekeeper's lodge in Korkusove Huti in the Sumava range, which I own together with my two brothers. The vacation house is quite beyond the familiar government center and I have one room for myself in the cottage. As far as cars go, I first had a Fiat 600, then a Fiat 850 and two Ladas—the last one is parked outside the house.

[ZEMEDELSE NOVINY] Were the cottage and vacation house guarded when you were there?

[Jakes] Not at all. Anyone could have come after me. The protective service drove me there, then returned to Prague and sometimes I spent perhaps a whole Saturday and Sunday absolutely alone. The vacation house has no telephone, one was installed in the cottage only in October 1989. That was done only after an incident when Lenart tried to get me late one evening. The manager of the Boubin recreation center, which is about 2 km away, wanted to get me to the phone but he returned unsuccessfully. He had in fact knocked on the window of my room but did not know that I was sleeping in the room at my brother's. The security people had to come and only then did they rouse me.

[ZEMEDELSE NOVINY] They say you could be seen skiing alone...

[Jakes] I like to go skiing and only a year ago I tried the ski runs in the Krkonose. I went by myself. In Svaty Petr one afternoon I stood alone three times in line for a half hour at the lift until it attracted attention.

[ZEMEDELSE NOVINY] Did you ever just walk along Wenceslas Square? Or perhaps go to an ordinary store to shop?

[Jakes] There wasn't much time for walks around Prague but there were occasions when I traveled by Metro. My wife and I used to go shopping to the House of Fashion

and to the men's clothing store near the Powder Tower. I got most of my clothing in the men's store. Once a week we went to the government store for some food items, chiefly soda and cartons of kefir [a kind of beverage of fermented milk] and biokys. I lunched at work and either kefir or biokys was and is my supper.

[ZEMEDELKE NOVINY] What was the monthly pay of secretaries of the central committee?

[Jakes] Around 16,000 net, the general secretary's was 19,000. As opposed to the ministers, however, no one offered me anything in kind. For members of the government the state paid for all operations—sometimes even furnishings—of apartments, villas, vacation homes and they were allowed a servant. And if a minister did not want a servant he got the money instead.

I bought everything out of my pay. In the government center at Orlik I routinely paid the menu prices. When my wife accompanied me two dinners cost us, say for Saturday and Sunday, about Kcs 100 [korunas]. Or take recreation. My wife and I and the children went to the Soviet Union. For a three-week stay for four persons I paid over Kcs 11,000 to the account of the CPCZ Central Committee.

[ZEMEDELKE NOVINY] Did the other secretaries, department heads and members of the CPCZ Central Committee presidium live and conduct themselves the same as you?

[Jakes] I don't know. I met with them only at work and I know nothing about their private lives.

[ZEMEDELKE NOVINY] Am I to understand that Husak, Hoffmann, Fojtik or Bilak were not your friends? Didn't you take vacations together? Didn't you visit one another?

[Jakes] That was not the situation in the party leadership. As I already said, we met only in the course of work. I was visited at home only by Lenart with whom I had studied in the Soviet Union. The first time was on New Year's Eve, back before 1968, and he stayed about an hour. The second time, he stopped over sometime in 1972 or 1973, shortly after I had bought the house. No one else was ever at my place and, with two exceptions, I never visited anyone at their home. The two exceptions were Lenart and then Husak who, shortly after a heart attack received me for 20 minutes in his home behind the Mint of the Prague castle.

I did not meet privately with the highest party officials, not even at Orlik when staying at the government center. At dinner, or when meeting by chance on a walk we talked together normally. I was at Hoffmann's summer place three times in connection with work. Husak is a loner. I never stepped into the vacation homes of Bilak, Fojtik, Indra, Kempny or others.

[ZEMEDELKE NOVINY] But as a professional politician you had your closest colleagues...

[Jakes] Yes, I can say three: Hoffmann, Adamec and Lenart. Hoffmann in fact had charge of the National Front, of which I was chairman, and the political organization division—that is, the party and its cadres. In the second place was Adamec as prime minister and the third was Lenart who was in charge of the economy and later international affairs.

[ZEMEDELKE NOVINY] Let us turn then to politics. Many people are wondering to what extent you were objectively informed about the situation in our society and in the world. Did you have sources available that provided the true picture?

[Jakes] Yes, I think so. Together with all the secretaries and members of the presidium I received the past year, for example, three times a week, collections of what people were saying about me, what they thought of the party leadership, etc. There also came from the ministry of the interior selective key information about the activities of the opposition specifically directed to this or that representative.

I also had monitors available but reading them would take several hours a day. It was the same with packets of coded messages from the foreign ministry. So a certain employee would underline the most important items for me or make notations—'to read' or 'not to read'.

I followed the Soviet press personally and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND from time to time. I never listened to foreign broadcasts nor would I ever have had time for it. In the morning, after seven I was already in the office; I returned home at 7:00 pm and read intelligence information until 11 and then went to bed. And it was the same with weekends at Orlik. Except for short walks, I was always reading or preparing for various discussions or appearances.

[ZEMEDELKE NOVINY] So the leading party representatives and you, personally, knew very well about the movement that was running through society. It was possible to react the way the majority of the nation wanted...

[Jakes] We did try that. An administrative political resolution was passed, we wanted to democratize society, carry out economic reforms, rejuvenate the CPCZ leadership. The new constitution was to delete the leading role of the CPCZ. Husak told me personally that he intended to give up the presidential office this year. Laws about the press and right of association and assembly were in preparation. But the legislators wanted them to be adopted only with the new constitution, on 28 October 1990. Now I know we should not have waited.

[ZEMEDELKE NOVINY] Did you ever try to understand the opposition, to consider their goals objectively?

[Jakes] I realized that without thorough democratization we could no longer go on. I felt, for example, that the party's reaction to "A Few Sentences" was inadequate and that we were giving the opposition an excessive, at

times needlessly hostile, blow. I could not bring myself to even imagine that we could go beyond 1948 where a large part of the opposition was aiming.

[ZEMEDELKE NOVINY] So why did you refuse so long and obstinately to make constructive contact with your opponents? Your political speeches, instead of being conciliatory, had more of a confrontational tone and poured oil on the fire.

[Jakes] That isn't entirely true. The first contacts were made with Obroda [Renewal]; we wanted to continue them and start to negotiate with Charter [77]. But imagine the following situation. Whereas today communists are coming out as revolutionaries and are fighting for their own renewal, not very long ago many of them acted just the opposite or at the very least, kept silent. The krajs, districts and even local organizations did not criticize us for not being very democratic and that we were not negotiating with the opposition. We were criticized for the fact that we were not firm enough and that we tolerated the opposition.

From almost all members of the central committee we heard at every meeting that the political situation in the country was not bad. Why, they said, do we tolerate disorders in Prague, why do we actually want to play with fire, how can we possibly negotiate with the church? Very few know of the immense resistance we met in the krajs and districts at our willingness to deal with the Vatican and fill the bishops' offices. We were called opportunists who were playing into the hands of the enemy forces.

[ZEMEDELKE NOVINY] What was the reason for resisting any kind of truly free public discussions?

[Jakes] We were victims of the persisting administrative management of the party. Any kind of move directed against structures accustomed for 40 years to make decisions on practically everything was unacceptable. The district, kraj and even headquarters apparatuses did not want to give up their power. After decades of holding leading roles in society, sanctioned by the constitution, the CPCZ lost its ability to conduct a normal political struggle. For 40 years there was no real political opposition in our country. The party was unprepared for a political struggle requiring a lot of inconvenient work which many had no taste for. They were all used to expecting that anything disagreeable would always somehow be resolved for them by someone higher up.

[ZEMEDELKE NOVINY] I am not a communist but I think I understood the tenor of your speech in Hradek, the famous statement of being a 'holdout'. At the time your appeal already seemed to me like a voice crying in the wilderness. The party, lulled to sleep by the certainty of total power, could only be aroused by a miracle.

[Jakes] Whoever at the time called out "we do not want the holdout" meant "we do not want Jakes." Even the communists were calling it. But I was not the only holdout. There was danger that it would be the whole

party and that was confirmed. What was I appealing for in Hradek? I said "you must understand that we cannot control the party and society by policy methods. You must fight. You must go out among the people, get into a regular political contest, begin to discuss matters openly with the people, give an answer to every question. We will not solve anything by shutting up."

[ZEMEDELKE NOVINY] Since we are talking about shutting up, the judges and prosecutors claim today that sentences against representatives of the opposition were given in advance by party staffers who exerted immense pressure to have them carried out. Did you personally issue any decisions about increased punishment?

[Jakes] Never, not once in my lifetime. I never asked that anyone sentence anybody, to say nothing of suggesting a verdict. On the contrary. At a certain aktiv of judges and prosecutors I severely criticized cases where people were held for a half-year or even a whole year awaiting trial.

[ZEMEDELKE NOVINY] Let us return to the situation within the party. It is well known that in the presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee Ladislav Adamec attempted a certain political move on his own accord. How did you accept that?

[Jakes] I agreed much of the time with Adamec. But we did not always share the same views, especially about the pact of political changes, including the question of cadres. The course of action that he sometimes chose met with criticism from some of the party members who called for consolidating the unity of the CPCZ.

[ZEMEDELKE NOVINY] What would have happened if you had announced that you were starting an open dialogue with the opposition? Do you think that you would have been removed?

[Jakes] I don't know.

[ZEMEDELKE NOVINY] Before you became general secretary you held some rather progressive views. People expected that you would pursue them energetically...

[Jakes] That was complicated. Many times, for example, I wanted to have those communists who had to leave the party in 1970 be invited to return. They ignored my request in the krajs and districts, nor was there any enthusiasm even in the presidium. I also took other initiatives but when I saw that they were not being supported by the majority of the presidium I did not proceed further. I did not want to act on my own accord and upset the collective decisions.

[ZEMEDELKE NOVINY] Why?

[Jakes] When I took over the office it was said everywhere that three men had ruled in the party for 20 years, Bilak, Husak and Strougal and the others were just figures. I did not want something like that to be repeated. I did not want to be blamed for disturbing the collective leadership.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] How did you take your ouster from the party?

[Jakes] It was a shock. Here I am sitting at home, the telephone rings and Comrade Holub tells me, on behalf of Comrade Urbanek, that I had just been removed from the party. The news, he said, will be on TV. But that cannot be true, I cannot believe it, I say into the telephone. It took a while before I came to my senses, then I quickly got dressed and left for the meeting of the central committee presidium. I asked that they admit me, but in vain.

It was 7:30 pm, I am waiting in an adjoining room and all of a sudden I see that my ouster is being reported on TV. The meeting ended, all are going out and greet me as if nothing had happened. Please tell me, how could you have done this, I ask Urbanek. We defended you, some of us defended you, said Urbanek, but the majority did not want to. There will be conferences and you know, they want someone to blame for everything. So I thanked him, we shook hands and I left.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] Do you still feel you are a communist?

[Jakes] Yes. All my life I lived modestly and dealt honorably and fairly. I never enriched myself at the expense of others.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] Did any of the former secretaries or members of the presidium like Husak, Adamec, Hoffmann, Fojtik, Pitra, or Knotek speak up to support you morally and admit to their share of the blame?

[Jakes] No, that did not happen.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] In conclusion, would you like to say something to the former opposition and the present government?

[Jakes] That today's winners not behave toward the defeated ones the way we communists did following 1968; that they learn what we did not learn and not drive into opposition even a single person who means well for the republic and wants to work for it.

## HUNGARY

### SZDSZ Leader Gaspar Miklos on Parties, Democratization, MSZ(M)P

90EC0281A Budapest UJ FORUM in Hungarian  
8 Dec 90 pp 38-40

[Interview with Tamas Gaspar Miklos, philosopher and executive officer of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], by Tamas Fricz, in Oct 89: "There Will Be No Glittery Development of Liberalism and Democracy This Time Either"; place of interview not given]

[Text] [UJ FORUM] The issue of political transition is being addressed by many people and in many different

ways. There are those who say that a transition from a single-party system to a multiparty system is taking place; there are those who speak of a restoration of national values; there are those who put the emphasis on the processes leading from dictatorship to democracy, and so forth. In your opinion, what does the present political transition mean to Hungary?

[Miklos] There is some truth, though, in all of those phrases which you listed and which I usually acknowledge with a half smile, because the multiparty system, or more precisely, a natural political segmentation, is no doubt being restored in Hungary. At the same time, I think the results of the elections will show that Hungarian electoral customs and the constituency's preferences have changed amazingly little in the past 60 or 70 years. I do not want to go into predictive details, but I am convinced that this time, too, the political front will operate alongside the "traditions." This is why the Stalinists, who say that a kind of restoration is going on at present, are actually partially right—but then, every revolution is also a restoration at the same time. How do I interpret the return to earlier conditions? I think that those "Christian" national forces which combine democratism with corporate "partialities" and a kind of value-preserving attitude, will probably constitute the majority, i.e., relative majority, in the new, freely elected parliament. The legal and economic views which happen to characterize the liberal camp are, to a certain degree, foreign to this trend and, consequently, the camp of liberalism, the camp of social democracy, and the camp of the communists will probably be in the minority. So the parliament that will be established in 1990 will be quite strongly reminiscent of the parliamentary circumstances of the early 1930s, adjusting that with elements of the coalition period.

[UJ FORUM] This is a very interesting postulate, for a 40-year "caesura" ensued in the political setting of post-1948 Hungary.

[Miklos] There are two reasons that this 40-year caesura is significant. On the one hand, today's developments are an indication of how superficial the state socialist revolution was (I dare to call it a revolution, in so far as its consequences were revolutionary and significant, completely independent of the fact that it was not the people themselves fighting it out). In the end, the totalitarian turn proved to be powerless to change people's political leanings. The latter seems to be rather unchanging; people's political loyalties easily return to normal beside the old ideological lines.

[UJ FORUM] Although in this case generations were deprived of the opportunity of political pluralism.

[Miklos] Yes, this is a rather amazing thing, and it shows the unbelievable strength of traditions. On the other hand, it is important to emphasize in connection with the past 40 years that, despite the revival of political traditions, the political-psychological structure that is developing can actually be built only on a 40-year

unchanged social-economic situation. This is why I am afraid that the democratic transition may prove to be superficial. For, let us suppose, a democratic parliament will be instituted, hopefully without a bolshevik president and with the instruments of oppression depoliticized, but even in this case the power of the central and local state apparatus, distinctly communist and intertwined with enterprise bureaucracy, will remain great. The economic structure may remain unchanged, and, what is perhaps even more important or at least as important, people's conditioning with regard to statism will remain unchanged, thus everything will continue to move around statism. On the one hand the state, as an institutional system that expresses the state elite's interests, will guard these interests, and, on the other hand, the manifest resistance against it will presumably also have a corporate character as far as the preponderance of abstract demands from the state are concerned. Whether we predict a "socialist" direction of events in the form of strikes, workers' demands, and wage disputes, or the struggles of other interest groups for the recognition of their own interests, the social groups will strive in any case, with expert pungency and determination, to institutionalize the guarding of their own interests and to make the state guarantee their interests, possibly with immobility and without regard to economic rationality.

[UJ FORUM] But, after all, this statism will be different from that of the past 40 years, for a monolithic statism can be replaced by many small statisms which can restrain one another.

[Miklos] I do not think at all that the creation of many small statisms is a positive thing. For the modern type democracies have gotten into a difficult position against a segmented and scattered statism even in the West, mainly because it is traditionally the central state which is obliged to render account, through the parliament, to the population. Those autonomous organizations and institutions which are publicly financed but are bound neither by the laws of the market nor by accountability to the constituency, and which abound in most West European countries (this is different in the United States), actually create small dictatorships. The goal of the neo-conservative trend, in Britain for instance, is precisely to dismantle these dictatorships. In Britain, the liberal intelligentsia think that the conservative government's fight against the BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation] is due only to a political bias, for the BBC belongs to the left wing. This also plays a role in the fight, but it is much more important that ultimately the BBC is a state-owned and publicly financed radio station, yet at the same time, the public cannot exert its influence through parliamentary control while the BBC, being a nonprofit organization, disregards the laws of the market. This is what I called "parallel state" in one of my articles published abroad, and the dismantling of this parallel state will be at least as important a task for the future's liberal forces as the struggle against central, and centralizing, statism has been from the past century to the present.

[UJ FORUM] It truly seems as though a large part of the intelligentsia also accept the well-known justification that all of our political problems will be solved by creating a democratic constitutional state.

[Miklos] I do not see it that way. Although constitutional statehood is really a popular slogan, it does not penetrate deeply enough. People see the assurance of the future mainly in liberation from the Communist Party and ideology, thus, when the opposition says that the only alternative to that is a constitutional state, then people accept the slogan of a constitutional state opposing the communists, but it is possible that they would have accepted other slogans as well. Still, real demands related to civil legal security and the freedom of movement also exist, e.g., the demand of legal resistance against tyranny. These are authentic impulses and strong passions manifest in the Hungarian people, but this does not mean that the people would refuse to accept a structure that would comply with the basic rules of fairness but would still be authoritarian. We are facing a very difficult issue, namely, that a social revolution may take place here—from above.

[UJ FORUM] What is the problem with having a revolution directed from above?

[Miklos] The problem is that even if a class in power is relieved without changing the operational structure of the economy and society we are facing an authoritarian-corporate turn. If this happens this way, then none of the things that are dear to me can prevail, namely maximum freedom for individuals and groups with a normal continuation of their traditions, and an attractive and organic order, developed by people's normal activities.

[UJ FORUM] But it seems that the platforms of the opposition parties, too, are very similar in many respects, offering virtually only a single alternative to communism.

[Miklos] Certain aspects of the parties' platforms really are virtually identical, but I consider our own platform, i.e., the SZDSZ platform of structural change, to be the best among them, for it includes not only political but also economic concepts. Our platform's terrible drawback is its complexity. This is unfavorable not only from the standpoint of propaganda, but also because it shows that no panacea has yet been found for curing the problems. Had we found it, it could be described very simply, for great discoveries and great truths are extremely simple. But, at the same time, the SZDSZ platform at least reckons with the fact that there are economic and social problems in our society. Ours is a liberal platform in its entirety, and it is interesting that our demand with regard to liberal constitutionality, for example, is included in every other platform, although speaking about it caused public scandal eighteen months ago. However, the demand for democratic constitutionality is endorsed today by every party, so the life of my friend Janos Kis may be rather strange today as his ideals resonate everywhere—for he was the first to adopt the



concept of constitutionality—while he himself is not being quoted. Indeed, even the MSZ(M)P's [Hungarian Socialist (Workers) Party] reform circles have adopted the concept of structural change!

What is unique about the SZDSZ platform is that, in addition to its constitutional and legal demands, it recognizes the importance of the economy, while, strangely enough, just like the other parties, the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party], as a Marxist party, does not deal seriously with problems of the economy, that is to say, they—at least the party's right wing—indiscriminately cram nonsocialist phrases into their platforms, the genuineness and sincerity of which is questionable. The manifesto of the MSZ(M)P banking reform circles, in which they say that socialism is untenable, and they proclaim entirely liberal regulations, is rather strange. I do not understand what people who are so liberal are doing in the MSZ(M)P, which is, after all, a socialist party. Its platform is much more right-wing than that of a Western social democratic party. This is when one feels that the whole thing is completely disoriented. Still, these people will not come over to the SZDSZ or FIDESZ [League of Young Democrats], for instance, because they still think that there—i.e., within the MSZ(M)P—they have a better chance for power and can work their way into the official institutions where they can try to implement their concepts. This, however, disregards the nature of things, for it is not worthwhile to draw up a liberal platform in a Marxist party. I know, of course, that liberal socialism did, and still does, exist in Hungary, e.g., around the MSZDP [Hungarian Social Democratic Party], and I can imagine that it may later attract a sizable camp, but, in spite of this, the MSZ(M)P reform circles ignore the fact that words and traditions do indeed have some kind of meaning, and that one cannot say just anything. Their standpoints are attractive, in fact they are ideologically close to me, but at the same time I consider them lacking in seriousness, regardless of their intellectual level (which is not that bad).

[UJ FORUM] Is it perhaps for practical and pragmatic reasons that certain MSZ(M)P circles adopt these liberal views?

[Miklos] No, we can even talk of seriously weighed principles. The issue is simply that a recognition of the nature of politics proclaims liberal thoughts within the framework of a socialist political tradition.

[UJ FORUM] Perhaps this, too, is instrumental in that the political lines have become rather nebulous within the MSZ(M)P.

[Miklos] No one takes the ideological differences within the MSZ(M)P seriously. What generally interests people in connection with the differences within the MSZ(M)P is whether or not the party in power will use force. Incidentally, I think it will not.

[UJ FORUM] What reason would you give for making this statement?

[Miklos] The reason is that, in the end, the party implemented its collapse within its own "sphere of authority." There is no reason, acceptable argument, or explanation for any forceful action. It is not possible to use force "just like that." Although people like Ribanszki and Berecz are preserving the old atmosphere, they are actually nostalgic and have offended people with shallow feelings, not leaning on deeply experienced values and ideologies; thus their views are not serious. The communist movement is dead; communist organizations and ideological memories still exist, of course, but there are, and can be, no politically active communists. What does it mean today to be a communist? Perhaps demanding the government's given policies? This means nothing, and this is precisely why there will be no use of force. That cannot be done without belief, charisma, and self-confidence. The 1981 Jaruzelski coup is entirely comical in retrospect. This is revealed, for example, by the present developments in Poland. The events there prove that bankrupt factories can be sieged and people can be locked up; but when the Jaruzelski regime, in its helplessness, began to speak of Kadarism as a goal to be attained, it became clear that not even Stalinism could develop from this. And they were unable to do anything about the economic problems.

[UJ FORUM] On the basis of the above, the SZDSZ is not in a distinguished position in terms of party chances. What is your opinion on this?

[Miklos] True, we are not in a good position. (The talk took place in early October. At the end of November, I see things differently—thank God. T.G.M.) This will yet change for the better, of course, but I am afraid it will not change enough. At any rate, it would be important for the people to have the opportunity to vote not only on empty rallying cries and slogans, which are only words, but to consider the meaningful endeavors as well. At present, however, many people would ignore the latter in voting, and this adversely affects the clarification of the political situation.

[UJ FORUM] Perhaps the SZDP [Social Democratic Party] is the best example, for many people sympathize with this party although their internal conflicts are well known.

[Miklos] Yes, but in spite of this there are also, of course, realistic differences between the individual parties' platforms if we pay close attention to their leaders' statements, but these differences are vague, obscured and insignificant for most people. I would like to emphasize, however, that the situation is entirely different on the political "bases." For instance, during my tours and speeches around the country, I constantly find that people come to hear me, they applaud, they are enthusiastic at the SZDSZ meeting, but in the end it turns out that they are MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] members. Evidently, the reason for this is that the people who come to these meetings form a general opposition community (although it is indeed true that most of them are MDF members). For country people, the differences

between the parties are especially insignificant; most opposition groups are rather radical in the country. In this respect, too, there is a minimal difference between MDF and SZDSZ groups in the country. By now there is, of course, a certain amount of institutional rivalry between them, but the spirit of these meetings is unbelievably similar. People think the same way here. There are some places, a few villages, where the SZDSZ alone is present, for the simple reason that we happened to be the first ones to form a group, and then there was no other place for the rest of the village's people to go; they did not join another organization, thus most of the village remained in the SZDSZ. Of course, this process gave the MDF the upper hand, for they began organizing themselves sooner all over the country and are also doing a better job.

[UJ FORUM] Thus a general spirit of opposition, which really cannot be divided, has developed throughout the country.

[Miklos] Yes, but if we begin to move toward the parties' higher echelons, the differences become more and more pronounced. Still, it is a fact that there are quite a few parties, e.g., the Hungarian People's Party, the Christian-Democratic People's Party, the Liberty Party, the Independence Party, the Independent Hungarian Democratic Party, the Hungarian National Christian-Democratic Workers Party, etc., that are really quite similar, and it is unquestionably difficult to differentiate between them, for they differ from one another mostly in terms of style.

[UJ FORUM] In the final analysis, what would you stress in the evaluation of the present balance of political forces?

[Miklos] I think that an adverse conflict is developing which is, historically "typically" false in Hungary, namely a conflict between parties that profess "European" values and the "national" or "patriotic" ones, which is not a modern political alternative. The consequence, however, may be that false coalitions could be formed again. Let us consider, for example, that there are still no coalitions on the liberal "European" side. (This has also changed in the meantime through the cooperation between the Free Democrats, the Smallholders, the Social Democrats, and FIDESZ.—T.G.M.) But a look at the statements of the MDF and the Smallholders Party will reveal apparent differences between them insofar as the MDF is a "communal" and collectivist party, having pushed in its first statements for the prohibition of exploitation, while the Smallholders Party stands unequivocally for private ownership and privatization, representing a market-oriented, liberal conservative platform. Nevertheless, this does not mean a real difference between them, and this is not what politicians are looking at when they seek cooperation; and so, in the end, a tactical alliance was created between the two parties despite their fundamentally different concepts. Aside from this, I see followers of every classic political doctrine in almost every party today. There is, however, something, in addition to the above, that differentiates

the parties, namely, a "tribal spirit", as I called it in HITEL. Individual political groups are separated from one another partly by common personal experiences and common life paths, and partly by traditions connected to certain rallying cries, rhetoric, faint recollections, and old wraths, and by initiatives from deep within. So our present political situation does not make a political pluralization that is healthy in a European sense possible.

[UJ FORUM] With which party is the SZDSZ likely to form an alliance during the coming period?

[Miklos] That depends on many things. In line with our liberal thinking, we should form an entirely natural alliance with the Smallholders Party and other similar parties which, incidentally, were established in the 1940's as the Smallholders Party's separate factions from the beginning, e.g., the Independence Party, but it seems that these are not the principles that really count in our party. Had we reconciled ourselves with a provincial line of demarcation (western vs. eastern), then the MSZDP could be our only ally. This would entail the restoration of the classic Hungarian political formula, meaning that the liberal parties always cooperated with the social democratic parties—let us think of Vazsonyi's or Jaszi's or Rassay's party, etc.—although the Smallholders are also liberal, of course.

[UJ FORUM] What is your view on the MSZMP's present position and its prospects?

[Miklos] I would not like to prophesy, for this question could be resolved in at least five different ways at the party congress. Some kind of a left-wing socialist party will remain on the political palette in any event, and I think that the leading stratum connected to the party may continue to count on lasting power both in the institutions of public administration and in the economy. But whether these strata will remain in the Communist Party or will leave, one cannot say for sure; this will depend on the events. At the same time, I do not believe the MSZMP will retain a decisive influence on higher politics, but one will have to reckon with it as a significant local and branch influence. I can even imagine that if a "Christian-national" faction would in fact be created, then they would be scared and would return to the MSZ(M)P. The latter event would give the MSZ(M)P a chance to preserve its power even in higher politics.

The MSZ(M)P has yet another chance to maintain its power, namely in connection with the SZOT [National Council of Trade Unions]. I think that the SZOT continues to be a faction of the Communist Party, although it is displaying social demagoguery and is organizing pseudoconflicts nowadays; it is well known, for instance, that enterprise executives participated in organizing the strikes last August. I can imagine a SZOT faction making a pact with the party's left wing. Although this will not happen in the near future, it could easily happen later. I

think that in that case a permanent conflict and confusion would emerge, for the Communists would be Communists—i.e., revolutionary socialists—again, trying to represent the industrial proletariat, stirring up discontent, and paralyzing the economy from without as they did previously from within.

[UJ FORUM] Do you see any realistic possibility that a change in the social system, of which the SZDSZ' platform also speaks, will really be implemented?

[Miklos] Only a great popular movement that is much more profound and radical than the present movement in Hungary would be able to change a social system in its entirety, and there are no such profound and radical movements in Hungary. Consequently, a change in the system can be gradual at best, which is not favorable from the aspect of our economic chances. It is impossible, and it would not even be right, to "create" a profound and radical popular movement through pious wishes and propaganda. I think, therefore, that we must reconcile ourselves to an ambiguous modernization and a one-sided and distorted development. But, then, modern Hungary has never been an organically developing country. Still, it is very good that a freer progression has finally taken off, and that there will be no glittery development of liberalism and democracy at this time. Considering the antecedents, this would be pure nonsense. Of course, it is very important for me to include in the present development as many liberal elements as possible, but this will not happen overnight. Thus, impatient people should not take part in politics in Hungary because they will become disillusioned and will, sooner or later, become apathetic.

[UJ FORUM] Thank you for this interview.

### Highlights of SZDSZ, FIDESZ Press Briefings Reported

25000660B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
9 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by "P.L.," unattributed article, and MTI report under the headline: "SZDSZ Confirms Willingness To Establish Coalition With the MDF"]

[Text] In principle, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] is willing to establish a coalition with the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], according to spokesman Ivan Peto at the SZDSZ briefing held yesterday at the Kossuth Club. "We have been proclaiming for a long time that under no circumstances would we want to form a government with the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] or the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] after the elections," he continued. "A change in regime will take place in this country only if the MSZP loses power," according to the spokesman.

Speaking of the Association of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], Peto said that the organization was close to the SZDSZ. In regard to the Smallholders and the Social Democratic Party of Hungary [MSZDP], the spokesman

said that a future coalition with these parties is conceivable. The SZDSZ has disputes with the Smallholders regarding land ownership, while SZDSZ differences with the Social Democrats exist in regard to relationships with branch trade unions. Peto believes that a strong government demands a strong majority in Parliament. The spokesman said that the small coalition that was formed at last November's popular referendum (SZDSZ, FIDESZ, Independent Smallholders Party [FKgP], and MSZDP) would acquire only a relatively small majority in Parliament, according to present public opinion survey results. A coalition with the MDF is needed to obtain a large majority.

Peto once again criticized radio and television oversight. The SZDSZ continues to regard as unacceptable the fact that on the one hand they are restricting the time available for political announcements, while on the other hand they are supervising political programs.

Gyorgy Daniss, member of the SZDSZ election committee, stated that they had one independent candidate, notably Bela Kiraly. He is running for the parliamentary mandate at Kaposvar and enjoys the support of the MDF, FIDESZ, and the SZDSZ.

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FIDESZ did not take part in Wednesday's national summit because, in its judgment, the meeting was not appropriately prepared.

Istvan Hegedus, a member of the steering committee, said that by the end of February it will become clear which political forces are of national significance, and at that time FIDESZ will not shrink from responding to the invitation.

Another announcement was made at the FIDESZ press conference: On 6 February the FIDESZ office at Pecs was vandalized.

In comparing the economic programs of the MDF, the SZDSZ, and their own party, Viktor Orban said that the MDF has in many respects come closer to the SZDSZ and FIDESZ. He stressed that the SZDSZ and FIDESZ programs differ on several points, particularly with regard to social policy issues.

Speaking of the government's economic policy, Orban said that the government was saying things the opposition says, but that it is going in the opposite direction from where it should be going. He made it clear that in his view the ruling party, i.e. the MSZP, has no comparable program. In his view, the Socialist Party did not surrender its earlier political line, and is not willing to give account of its property. It did not return the real estate or the county newspapers, and it does not even want to negotiate about the future of NEPSZABADSAG.

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As of 1400 hours on 8 February, the Baranya County Police Headquarters had not received any information

concerning the criminal act involving the above-mentioned city election office, and consequently had not initiated police action.

### **Elections: January Poll Shows SZDSZ Ahead of MDF**

*25000656A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 17 Feb 90 p 9*

[Article by Endre Hann: "Public Mood for Coalition?"]

[Text] If the end of January had not marked the beginning of the campaign, the actual elections could have taken place at that time. Instead, it is likely that a weak government coalition led either by the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] or the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] could come about, according to a survey conducted between 19 and 26 January by Median Public Opinion and Financial Research, Limited on a 1,200 sample population of voting age persons. Although public opinion research is unable to simulate actual election conditions because of a complicated, multistep nominating and election system, it is suitable for the indication of trends that prevail in society.

Between the November popular referendum and the second half of January, the number of persons agreeing to be involved in active political participation has narrowed somewhat. In Median's November survey, 32 percent of the respondents stated that they would not vote if the elections were held on the following Sunday. That percentage is 36 percent in the present survey. It can easily happen that this proportion will not change significantly until 25 March, meaning that about two-thirds of the eligible voters will decide the parliamentary seats. This is not a bad ratio, compared to [voter participation data] abroad. On the other hand, within the two-thirds of society prepared to vote, the ratio of those unable to name from memory a party that could win their confidence has declined substantially, from 37 percent to 27 percent.

Along with the Association of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] and the SZDSZ, the greatest beneficiary of greater party knowledge among voters is the Smallholders Party [FKgP], while the rest of the parties at least did not strengthen their positions. Any estimate based even on the best statistical sample has a plus or minus two to three percent margin of error, but the trend shown by the five point gain by the SZDSZ, and a two point gain both by FIDESZ and the Smallholders is by all means noteworthy, particularly if one views the one point loss each recorded by the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party [MSZMP], and the Social Democratic Party of Hungary [MSZDP]. This loss may be regarded at least as stagnation. Along with this, support for smaller parties seeking their places in the shadow of the "large" parties has increased by five points, from the previous two percent to seven percent.

When the people's ability to make a choice was assisted by cards showing the names of a dozen parties, the ratio of "don't know" votes declined by a further 12 percentage points. The added votes contributed something to all seven parties mentioned above, but they contributed somewhat more to the ascending parties (SZDSZ, FKgP, FIDESZ) than for the stalled parties (MDF, MSZP, MSZMP) which received a lesser share. Thus for the first time, the SZDSZ, even though only by a hair, is ahead of the MDF, and the FKgP took third place, pushing the Socialists behind.

The final decisions will be made in voting districts, in awareness of candidates, and in the struggle of programs and personalities, of course. For this reason, based merely on questions concerning parties, it is impossible today to risk making a real forecast. But one of the questions asked in the survey, inquiring about which party's candidate would the voter choose if the candidate he supports would not get on the ballot, contributes to the understanding of trends, and perhaps brings one closer to evaluating the chances in a possible second round of elections. It turned out that such "redirected" votes would be cast mostly for FIDESZ, the MDF, and the SZDSZ (each receiving about 10 percent of the increment), while the FKgP, the MSZDP and the MSZP could count on only about half as much (seven, six, and five percent).

In light of all this it appears that at the start of the election campaign the SZDSZ and the MDF are the two strongest political forces, but for the time being neither of these is strong enough to form a government individually or in conjunction with their natural allies. Accordingly, signs indicate that they would have to put feelers out in other directions. The strengthening Smallholders Party—with its support in the villages and with the need to simultaneously represent national and liberal ideals—is an attractive partner to both parties, and thus may serve as the balancing factor, although its division may confuse voters, which in turn reduces the FKgP's chances.

Insofar as the relationship between the two great rivals is concerned—even though it thawed as compared to the freezing point of November—for the time being the MDF has not decided to publicly think about a possible coalition to be formed with the SZDSZ. This was confirmed by the MDF chairman's weekend news conference. On the other hand, the SZDSZ spokesman last week discussed a possible MDF-SZDSZ "grand coalition," as a condition for the desired strong government. Despite the controversy between the two leaderships, within society one can sense the need for an approach: In the event that their own candidate fails, more than one-fifth of MDF supporters would accept the SZDSZ candidate, while one-sixth of the SZDSZ followers would vote for the MDF candidate. At the same time, virtually no one from among MSZP voters would vote for the SZDSZ candidate as a second choice, while the MDF candidate would be acceptable to every sixth MSZP member.

Which party would you vote for if the elections were held this coming Sunday? (percentage of those prepared to vote)			
	25 Nov Poll (816 Persons)	19-26 Jan Poll (763 Persons)	
	Open Question *	Open Question *	Closed Question **
Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)	10	15	18
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)	17	16	17
Independent Smallholders (FKgP)	9	11	14
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)	13	11	12
Association of Young Democrats (FIDESZ)	3	6	9
Social Democratic Party of Hungary (MSZDP)	5	4	5
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP)	4	3	4
Other parties	2	7	9
TOTAL	100	100	100

\* Those questioned answered without any assistance.

\*\* Those questioned chose the name of the party from a list presented to them.

### MSZMP Says Right-Wing Victory Means Petty Bourgeois Dictatorship

25000660A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 7 Feb 90 p 4

[Text] The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] Obuda organization held a grand rally, at which Attila Regoczi, the district's candidate for representative, was introduced. He has already received 750 nominations.

In the presence of some 50 interested persons, Laszlo Udvarhelyi, MSZMP Central Committee domestic policy secretary, reported the party's election platform. He stressed that socialism has reached a crossroads and that the newly reorganized MSZMP would depart from the mistakes of the past, but it would not renounce Marxist ideals in an opportunistic manner. In the speaker's view, the threat of a bourgeois and capitalist restoration is real; this is being presented by rival parties as a lure to the manipulated masses, even though capital has not entered a single country on the basis of charity. If Hungary chooses the capitalist path, it will not end up in Switzerland, but in mass unemployment and exploitation. The speaker condemned the government's tax and wage policies, and objected to selling out enterprises under the pretext of reprivatization. In his view, a petty bourgeois dictatorship disguised as a multiparty system will have its beginnings if the right wins, and people of left-wing leanings will only be persecuted. For this reason the MSZMP counts on a very tense election campaign. In conclusion, Udvarhelyi announced to the audience, a

majority of which was composed of people of retirement age: Contrary to what very many parties would like to believe at this point, the struggle has not been decided, and it is possible that many will be surprised on 25 March.

### MSZP Proclamation Charges Extremism, Calls for New Negotiations

25000613H Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 20 Jan 90 p 3

[Text] Proclamation by the Socialist Party [MSZP]

Compatriots! Peaceful transition is being endangered: Selfish interests are overtaking the national interest. They are inciting the fire of emotions. It is of concern that the free elections will not really be free, and that they will not bring about true social peace. The extremes will come to the surface and will achieve power that molds public opinion, while sober forces in society appear powerless against the extremes. The possibility of an economic upswing is threatened.

Today they are calling upon all forces to unite, against socialism, so they say. There are ideals which could be infringed upon, but not destroyed: the ideals of freedom, justice, equality, and solidarity. Socialism will not be lost if these ideals are lost. Instead, everything that is progressive in the history of the Hungarian people and Europe will be lost.

Public opinion is burdened by an extremely heavy weight. The demand to reject everything that has taken place in Hungary since 1945 is increasing to hysteric proportions. They are placing an era in the prisoner's box, an era whose crimes are indeed unforgivable, if for no other reason because they made a mockery of ideals. But we are not the heirs of the criminals, we are the heirs of ideals. We know that we must prove this fact, and we are prepared to do so in the spirit of Petofi, Ady, and Attila Jozsef.

While the extremists preach about human rights, free elections, and a pure democracy they also declare collective responsibility. Once again the "charge of ritual murder" raises its head against almost 1 million former party members, and the far greater number of sympathizers. We are not defending ourselves, we are defending the country which suffered torture, misery, and sweat so that Hungary would be at the forefront of a camp called socialist, in the field of prosperity, freedom, and human rights.

The country is preparing for elections. Democracy is not only a law and a rule, it also means humane conduct, a balanced state of mind, and life without fear. This applies to persons who think differently, to respect for the opposing view. We sat down to the national round-table with the various organizations of society in the interest of democratic transformation. We did everything possible so that our joint agreements would

become law. This is no bragging and it is no prerogative: It was our duty. They should not cast doubt upon our decency.

Some long months which will try both human beings and decency are ahead of us. We collapsed under our debts, and even more so under our awareness of debt—a debt that is being painted in doomsday colors. It is not our intention to keep the difficulties a secret, we do not wish to speak against the unavoidable actions. We are speaking up against their actions by which they depict an economic situation as national death, while recently several states in the world have recovered in the course of a few years from similar economic situations.

The Socialist Party once again attests to its belief in equality irrespective of origin, race, gender, occupation, or religion, and stands up against playing the game of equality. It attests to its belief that women are equal, that the elderly should be respected fairly, that the conditions for youth to start careers and opportunities for their self fulfillment should be assured, and that poor people have rights. At the same time, it attests to the belief that those able to produce multiples of the average production should not receive only pennies more than the average. It attests to a belief in talent, in the sense of initiative, in diligence, and in honest work.

It is not true that we are backward in the Central European region. We were among the first, we, the Hungarian socialists who sought our own path, who struggled for the freedom, the welfare, and the European character of this region. In Hungary the foundations of a market economy and a democratic legal system have been established already.

We are issuing this proclamation to the country, because we feel that peaceful, democratic transition and public peace are endangered by the omnipotence of party interests, by the threat of ignoble methods that are inappropriate in democracies, and by the deterioration of public order, public security, and public morals, which raises concern. The public taste is being slapped in the face with increasing frequency, and they are kicking the basic sense of human decency. We must learn about democracy. This country will lose democracy, unless it allows itself time to learn about democracy.

Social demagoguery does not resolve the concerns of society, it leads to political extortion. We hold the freedom to express interests and even to hold warning strikes as the natural rights of societally organized workers. But it would be a tragedy if Hungary were to become a country of sequential, broadly based, and general strikes.

Compatriots!

We call upon all democratic forces in the country to fight the extremes, as well as indecent political means.

We call upon those who participated in the political conciliatory negotiations to contribute to the publication

of documents produced by the negotiations, so that the country may have a clear picture of those negotiations.

We call upon the National Assembly and the head of government to publicize the minutes of reminders pertaining to the December 1989 negotiations with various political forces and social organizations.

We believe that under the present circumstances all these agreements will not suffice. It is for this reason that we propose the initiation of new negotiations, or that the participants affirm the results achieved thus far.

Amid the disintegrating public legal system we request that the provisional president of the Hungarian Republic immediately make an initiative so that parties, the government, social organizations, and interest protection organizations once again may sit down at the table and attest to the fact that they take responsibility for a peaceful transition. We ask the National Assembly to support initiatives for the achievement of peaceful transition.

A peaceful future is the result of a peaceful transition.

### **Hungarian Socialist Party Election Campaign Platform**

#### **Final Official Text**

*25000651 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
3 Feb 90 pp 18-19*

["The Hungarian Socialist Party's Election Program"]

[Text]

#### **There Is No Democratic Hungary Without the Socialist Party**

The Hungarian people have established lasting values during the past decades. The Socialist Party appeals to those who appreciate these values, and who are concerned about the security of their families and children and the belongings they have acquired as a result of hard work. The party counts on the support of all, who want to do something to resolve the crisis, for the nation's uplift, and for the preservation of peace in society.

As in the rest of the East-Central European countries, a historic, epochal change is taking place in Hungary. Almost everywhere in the region, the dictatorial state has fallen apart, in part as a result of comprehensive reform measures, and in part as a consequence of exploding revolutionary changes. The East German, Czechoslovakian, and particularly Romanian events have proven the changes in Hungary to be correct. The forces that brought about the Hungarian Socialist Party played a decisive role in the initiation and realization of these changes.

The Socialist Party is the heir to, and represents, the continuity of the socialist reform movement which has been alive and fighting since 1953. The forces of this

movement have struggled against dictatorial state socialism, they headed the economic reform experiments of the 1960's; by taking risks, they have taken under their guardianship the right to think differently, and they have protected several representatives of today's opposition.

The new party's initiators were among the first in East-Central Europe to recognize that the system of Stalinist origins perceived to be socialism is unsuited to keep in step with global development. For this reason there is a need to change the regime. The Hungarian Socialists have delimited themselves from earlier policies, from principles and methods that proved to be erroneous, and have departed from the practices of the party state.

#### **For the New Republic**

Democratic socialism is the goal of the Socialist Party: the autonomy of the people in the worlds of labor and politics.

Already thus far the party has introduced a number of internationally recognized, high caliber initiatives for the achievement of a constitutional state, a democratic republic. It is in our national interest for the historic epochal change to take place in a peaceful manner, with the least possible shock to society, and that the changes do not lead to anarchy. Only a strong, democratic left can protect against extremist forces which are not afraid to use means of intimidation, and which prepare themselves for reckoning.

#### **The Socialist Party Is the Party of Progress, Security, and Solidarity**

The Socialist Party is the party primarily of those who want to make a living based on their work, their performance. It protects the interests of physical and white collar workers who work in industry and in agriculture, and those who provide services. A further deterioration in the situation of skilled workers, businessmen, public officials, and educators threatens the country's future, because the position our country occupies in the new Europe will depend upon the success of their work.

The Socialist Party counts on small entrepreneurs who make a living based on their property and on their work. It expects a higher technical standard, increased production, and the creation of new jobs by expanding private property. Our party feels that there is a need for society to control capital with legitimate economic means. Entrepreneurship must not mean just the redistribution of income.

Our party is aware of the difficult situation being experienced by youth. It understands youth's emotions, and does not want to win their support by making irresponsible promises. On the other hand, our party promises that those who complete their education will not have to begin their adult lives unemployed, and a socialist government would effectively support the young in acquiring their first apartments.

The Socialist Party speaks out for the resolution of pensioners' concerns. It respects all those who have worked for the prosperity of the country during the past decades. Despite the economic difficulties, the party endeavors to establish living conditions which the aged deserve.

The Socialist Party pays distinguished attention to the situation of women. Its ideal is that women should be able to exert influence commensurate with their role both at the workplace and in political life. The party demands that the state take over more of the burdens related to families and the upbringing of children. It endeavors to achieve a situation in which women may freely choose between an income-producing occupation or the household, the raising of children and caring for the elderly if they regard that as their main avocation.

#### **We Fight for Democratic, Socialist, and National Goals**

The new party continues the legacy of the socialist movement still alive today. Therefore, along with bourgeois democratic ideals, it also espouses the principles of solidarity and social justice. It also seeks answers to today's issues by using Marxist ideology as its resource.

A nation can take advantage of freedom only if its citizens are free of want. Instead of playing the game of equality, the Socialist Party proclaims equality. It does not want uniformity, it wants equal opportunity in acquiring work, and economic and cultural benefits instead. It recognizes the existence of substantial differences in income, as long as such differences are based on actual performance. It accepts solidarity with those who were squeezed to the peripheries of society not by their own fault, and with the disadvantaged strata. It firmly condemns all kinds of discrimination in society.

#### **I. The Economy Should Serve the People!**

##### **Our Place in Europe**

The Socialist Party stands for a more forceful integration with the global economy, in such a way that our economic sovereignty will not be violated.

Anyone aware of realities will know that we can join the European Community only in the more distant future. Until such time, we should endeavor to pursue mutually advantageous cooperation, and liquidate discriminatory measures which adversely affect Hungarian goods. We should streamline our basic economic institutions in the upcoming years with the post-1992 European economic order.

We should encourage the new type of cooperation between Austria, Yugoslavia, Italy, and Hungary that has begun already.

Today, the Hungarian economy is not functional without the cooperation of East European countries. On the other hand, we intend to place our relationships on entirely new foundations. We must change over to account settlement based on convertible foreign



exchange. Interstate agreements should be replaced by market relationships between enterprises as soon as possible.

### **A Change in Economic Policy**

The shaken system of social security can be restored only if the economy embarks on a path of balanced growth. In the Socialist Party's view the economic policy pursued thus far will not lead the country out of crisis. There is a need for change.

Only the selective growth of the economy can provide resources for viable ventures, and can accelerate structural transformation which has barely begun. According to the Socialist Party, along with exports to capitalist countries, the domestic market also plays an important role in invigorating the economy. Only a new economic policy holds out the hope of stopping the decline of real wages within a few years. In realizing these goals, we are counting primarily on the knowledge, experience, and preparedness of Hungarian enterprise managers, entrepreneurs, and technical and economic professionals to innovate.

### **Breaking Out of the Indebtedness Trap**

The gravest economic concern faced by a majority of the world's countries—irrespective of their social systems—is their large-scale indebtedness. The Hungarian economic crisis may be reduced if we find various alternatives for breaking out of the indebtedness trap, while preserving our solvency. The Socialist Party encourages negotiations with the governments of creditor countries in the interest of alleviating our debt burden. We initiate a common stand for the international settlement of the crisis.

### **High-Level Employment**

As a left-wing party, the Socialist Party struggles to achieve the modernization of the economy, coupled with the lowest possible unemployment. It rejects the perception which holds that large-scale unemployment is the natural price for economic progress. It intends to protect strata which would fall victim to structural transformation. Unemployment may be alleviated by regional employment funds, programs that create jobs and provide training, part-time employment, and by providing preferential pension payments. It regards unemployment assistance only as a last resort, but feels that it must guarantee existential security, nevertheless.

### **Stable Forint**

Inflation is public enemy No. 1 of our economic and social development today: It slows down structural transformation, channels capital toward speculation, and accelerates the division of society into rich and poor.

The Socialist Party takes a firm stand in favor of a consistent anti-inflationary policy. Even in the present economic situation the government has the means to

slow down inflation: by formulating competitive market conditions, by reducing budgetary expenditures, taxes, and other excises, and by instituting a real reconciliation of interests. Inflation may also be slowed down by accomplishing a reduction in our debt burden through economic diplomacy. The rate of price increases may be reduced if we are not forced to accomplish an excessive devaluation of the forint and to force exports. Until such time that a balance in the domestic market is achieved, the government must continuously control the prices of basic consumer goods and services.

## **II. A Mixed Economy, Ownership by Workers!**

### **Socialists for Proprietary Reform**

The Socialist Party endeavors to establish a mixed economy, based on communal property and on societally controlled private property. It wants to discontinue the excessive nationalization of the earlier decades. It regards private property as the indispensable moving force for growth, and it supports cooperation with foreign capital. The societal value of ownership forms must be measured by the extent to which they contribute to the enrichment of the community.

### **Community, Worker, and Employee Ownership**

Proprietary reform should take place, in part, by socializing, and in part by privatizing property. The goal of the Socialist Party is for public institutions (social security fund, insurance companies, foundations, and autonomous governments in settlements) to own a significant proportion of the nation's assets.

We want workers to become the real owners through their self-directing organs. Enterprise collectives should have a say in the change of ownership. Separately encouraging the purchase of stock by workers by granting tax and credit preferences is warranted. Employees should be able to acquire stock in enterprises they work for under advantageous terms. State-controlled lands and apartments, and the buildings of public institutions, should become the properties of settlements, and they should be managed on the basis of decisions made by the citizens residing in those settlements.

The Socialists are against selling out the nation's assets at a price below their value, and against manipulations transferring such assets into the hands of those who have managed them without producing results. The communal property should be made to appreciate by competent property management organizations.

### **Democracy in the Economy**

Workers' and employees' councils should be established in enterprises remaining under state ownership, as well as in enterprises transferred to private ownership. Their right to intervene should extend to the most important decisions affecting the functioning of the enterprise, as



well as to living and working conditions. The role of trade unions as a catalyst should prevail in developing a participatory system.

The socialist movement and the trade union movement are inseparable allies. In our view, the interests of employees may be best represented by a strong trade union alliance based on volunteerism, which encompasses the entire movement.

We support trade union endeavors to restrict the prevalence of ownership interests by legal means.

#### **A Market to the Extent Possible, the State to the Extent Necessary**

There is no viable mixed economy without various forms of investment. This is why it is necessary to dismantle administrative and financial barriers which hinder ventures as soon as possible. We think that an enterprise-oriented environment is one in which not only the one who has property, but also the creative person who is prepared to make initiatives, is able to prosper.

The state must not remove itself from controlling the economy, but there is a need for less bureaucracy, and for greater professionalism. The manner in which the state influences economic processes should be apparent to the citizens, entrepreneurs, and foreign partners. The Socialist Party's watchword: There should be security based on law in the economy!

#### **The Tax Burden Should Be Relaxed**

The taxation system must not be subordinated to momentary considerations affecting the treasury. We support a tax system which upholds incentives related to more and better work, and to intellectual achievement. Families living below the existential minimum should be exempt from paying taxes. A tax system based on families is needed, and one that is also gentle to persons earning a low or medium income. A smaller proportion of income derived from excess performance should be withdrawn by the budget. Enterprises which enhance structural transformation and which establish themselves in crisis zones should receive further tax benefits. The authority to impose taxes should be granted to local autonomous governments in order to reduce the central tax burden. A proper tax system, proper taxation!

#### **The State Household Should Serve Society**

The budgetary deficit must be reduced, but money should not be taken away from education, health care, scientific research, or disadvantaged social groups. Subsidies that are provided for uneconomical exports should be reduced instead.

Autonomous communities, settlements, may only become truly independent if they can manage independently the tasks and central budgetary means that are

proportionate to their own resources, and if they are freed from repeated new excises imposed in the course of the year.

#### **Modern Technology and an Information Society**

These days the possession of information has become one of the chief resources of the economy. Our country can achieve economic success only through material- and energy-saving products, and products which embody scientific and technical knowledge. The transition to an economy based on information and modern services must be accelerated. Reducing our backwardness as compared to developed countries is an existential issue. To accomplish this we must open a free path for modern technology. Enhancing technological development should become a national movement. At universities, academies, and intermediate schools let us begin to teach subjects that are appropriate to the needs of technological development, and let us stimulate involvement of the best professionals in education. By providing benefits, the government should encourage more Hungarian professionals and skilled workers to take part in continued education in developed countries, and should encourage putting knowledge thus acquired to use in Hungary.

A technical intelligentsia which is well trained and has the spirit of innovation is one of the keys to modernizing the economy. It is fair to provide a greater income for activities which produce results.

### **III. A Flourishing Hungarian Village!**

The epochal achievement in the creative work of the peasantry and the Hungarian agrarian intelligentsia is the transformation of the Hungarian village. In the course of a few decades our agricultural economy has reached European standards, compared to its backwardness prior to the war. Our achievements by way of cooperation in the field of state, cooperative, and small production have international significance. The security of the country's food supply is an important element of social stability. No one has the right to endanger this.

#### **Land Should Belong to the One Who Cultivates It**

The Socialist Party defends the values of the cooperative movement. It regards cooperatives not only as a proprietary form and a form for organizing work, but also as the promising model for socialist values, for thinking in terms of the community, and for viable economic self-governance. The forced liquidation of large plants would put at risk the livelihood of hundreds of thousands, and the provisions needed by millions. Agricultural proprietary reform must take place under societal control, consistent with the will of the affected persons.

The general meeting should be able to transfer ownership rights attached to the common arable land owned by cooperatives, but common fields should not be broken up into parcels. Members of cooperatives should be able to freely decide, without central intervention, about

member-owned arable land commonly used by the producer cooperative. The private ownership of arable land, or its regulated free purchase or sale, should be fully protected. Socialists support the evolution of modern farmer [as published] farming units, to the extent that this is based on economic rationale. State farm and food industry workers should be able to acquire stock ownership in the plants they work for.

#### **The Agricultural Economy Should Also Enrich the Producer**

Agricultural producers have been struck for years by adverse agricultural parity and increasing withdrawals. Food production, the supply of food to the populace, and the country's foreign exchange income will become secure only if agricultural parity is improved and budgetary withdrawals are reduced. We support a predictable tax and credit system adjusted to the peculiar features of agriculture, to the high risks involved in agricultural production. We defend tax benefits to which agricultural small producers are entitled.

Agricultural subsidies compete in world markets today, not agricultural prices. For this reason there will be a continued need for state support in the future. The state must help establish the introduction of the most modern techniques and technologies, and new forms of partnership. Only in this way can we improve our international competitive edge. The new subsidy system should be neutral to the various sectors.

There is a need for a fundamental turnaround in the lives of villages. Every village should be given back its governmental administration, education, and culture. We want villages to regain their political and economic independence. We encourage the reduction of disadvantages in the fields of employment, supplies, and infrastructure in villages and in small towns.

#### **IV. An Inhabitable Environment for Our Descendants!**

Economic growth, and catching up in the field of engineering, are existential issues from the nation's standpoint, but they should not be achieved at the price of destroying the natural environment. Whatever causes damage to the environment is not rational from an economic standpoint. Everyone has a right to live in a healthy environment. We encourage organizations and movements which use the power of publicity, and we take a stand against any kind of environmental pollution by giving voice to public opinion.

Strict laws should obligate industrial and agricultural ventures to apply technologies which are gentle to the environment, and to abate the damaging consequences of their activities. We are encouraging a lasting and satisfactory solution for the storage of radioactive waste. The government must support initiatives for the economical use of alternative energy resources (solar, wind, agricultural waste). Environmental investments may also be suitable for the reduction of unemployment.

#### **V. A Modern Social State!**

##### **Existential Security**

The Socialist Party believes that every person, even the poorest, should have an income that covers the minimum subsistence level. Our program serves to strengthen solidarity between generations, regions, and genders, and is aimed at preventing a situation in which an increasing number of people are pushed to the periphery of society. For this reason the social state must not be dismantled. It must be renovated instead. The social state serves to improve the chances of the weak; as a result of its involvement, disadvantages which appear independent of an individual's action may be reduced.

We want a society in which everyone can make a secure living from the income earned through work or property, or from social provisions. We are aware of the fact that decisions concerning the methods of accomplishing this, and the extent to which this can be implemented, depend upon the available resources and means. Societal control over distribution shall prevail through Parliament and through the democratic organizations of society (interest representations, self-governments).

##### **In Defense of Those Who Fall Behind**

Social welfare provisions should be provided to everyone living below the minimum subsistence level, without them having to apply. Cumbersome administration and humiliation which injures a person's self-respect should come to an end. Providing for those who find themselves at the periphery is society's job. The Socialist Party fights impoverishment, not enrichment.

##### **Equal Opportunity**

The definitive factor in overcoming disadvantages in society is to provide approximately equal educational and cultural opportunities to people. For this reason it is necessary to support the continued education of children from families making a modest income by way of foundations, a college network, educational loans, and assistance provided in the form of educational materials. We encourage the introduction of a tuition and scholarship system which also utilizes state funds to help the integration of strata which fall behind. A separate state fund should make adaptation easier for those seeking their first job. There should be no more generations which get lost, and which lose their goals and perspectives!

##### **Secure Old Age, Dignified Livelihood**

The state must guarantee on as broad a basis as possible that pensions retain their worth, and that not even the lowest of pensions fall below the minimum subsistence level. The coverage of pensions is several decades of honest work performed, and the contributions paid in by the elderly [as published]. The present retirement age is the achievement of our system. Socialists fight an increase in the retirement age.

We support a pension system which ensures a basic pension benefit that is proportionate to the expenditures involved in making a living. Over and above that, any pension benefit should express the differences between work performance. An opportunity for supplemental pension insurance on a voluntary basis should be established on as broad a basis as possible. At the same time, we are against extremely high pension payments. A maximum limit must be established for pension benefits paid on the basis of work performance.

#### **The Collateral for the Family's and Society's Future**

The Socialist Party demands that tax preferences granted to families with children be increased. It supports the extension of child care support payments to the age of three. We wish to have women's role played in the raising of children, in caring for their families, recognized as work at its full value. Family members caring for retarded children, or for ill, aging parents at home should receive a specific amount of income. Basic consumer goods and cultural products should continue not to be the subjects of general sales taxes. The most important food products should be reclassified into maximized price categories.

#### **A Healthy Hungarian People**

The high suicide rate, the spread of diseases caused by addiction, and the declining average age have been painful phenomena in Hungary for a long time. We believe that these trends which have struck the Hungarian people for almost a century can be halted and turned around. For this reason we are proclaiming a new health policy.

In addition to providing for the ill, the teaching of healthful habits and the prevention of diseases are health care functions of equal value. Local health care funds are needed to support the most endangered persons. The Socialist Party aims to bring about economic conditions in which a decent livelihood, a harmonious life that befits people, can be achieved without physical or intellectual self-exploitation.

Pure value and interest relationships in healing! Health care provisions should be paid for by social security on an item by item basis. Basic provisions should continue to remain free. Free choice of physicians! There should be no gratuities; doctors and nurses should be paid well instead. We agree with the idea that private individuals and churches should be able to maintain health care institutions.

#### **VI. Knowledge and Scientists Should Be Appreciated!**

##### **We Should Spend More on Culture**

Hungary can be modernized only by increasing the nation's culture and the citizens' professional knowledge. A country which pays educators well, at a level commensurate with their sacrifices, has a secure future. To accomplish this, the proportion of the national

income spent on education and culture must be increased. We recommend a regulatory system which provides incentives to people, enterprises, and institutions to contribute to educational and cultural investments, and which enforces the viewpoints of culture and public education within the state household.

#### **Free Path for Talent**

The searching for, and fostering of talent is a national cause. For this reason, any action which cares for talent deserves support. The evolution of talent may be enhanced by supplementing education provided in schools with new, extracurricular forms of training. Local funds should be established to be used by settlements endeavoring to supplement cultural shortcomings from their own resources.

#### **For the Free Competition of Ideals, To Protect the National Culture**

According to the Socialist Party, making culture uniform on the basis of any ideological, political, or market principle is harmful. The national culture must not be made dependent on day-to-day political issues or on business and commercial considerations.

Free time is the basic condition for acquiring culture. Due to the present condition of the economy, and because of the need of employed persons to make a living, the time spent on work has increased dangerously. It is our party's goal to reacquire free time.

### **VII. The People's Will in Politics!**

#### **A Democratic Constitutional State**

The Socialist Party endeavors that Hungary be a democratic constitutional state, and that the constitution guarantee human and civil rights. The exercise of power shall be based on popular sovereignty. The community of autonomous citizens shall be the trustee of democracy, a community which creates local autonomous governments and a sovereign legislature. The Socialist Party supports a balanced distribution of power between organizations and power centers. This may prevent the evolution of overly centralized power, the policy of force. Persons of the socialist persuasion are also entitled to think differently in a democratic constitutional state.

#### **Public Security, the Protection of Public Order**

According to the Socialist Party, constitutional statehood means respect for laws: It means that the freedom of citizens is guaranteed by the constitution, and that this freedom may be restricted only by law. State organs must not abuse their power.

People have a right to expect to know that their belongings are safe, and that their street and home will not become the scenes of criminal activities. The Socialist Party demands professional police services, so that we may stand up against the spread of criminal activities,

and against forms of criminal activity which create increasing concern: organized and international crime.

#### **Strong Local Autonomous Government**

The activities of autonomous governments shall be restricted exclusively by law. County council organizations and interference with the workings of autonomous governments in settlements shall be discontinued. Educational and health care associations, and offices providing legal oversights, shall function on the basis of countywide jurisdiction. Local autonomous governments in settlements shall be built on the principle of self-regulation. Substantive decisions should not be made by apparatuses, but by council bodies. The most important issues faced by autonomous governments shall be decided in popular referendums.

#### **Professional Administration, Corruption-Free Offices**

It is the right of public servants to belong to any constitutional party. At the same time, it is their obligation to perform their duties independent of their political views or party affiliation, professionally, pursuant to law. The Socialists recommend that a decisive majority of the leading public administrative positions be filled on the basis of open competition. In competing, every qualified person shall have a chance, and the award of public administration positions shall not be determined by the bounty acquired by parties.

The Socialist Party objects to disadvantageous discrimination against, or new layoffs of public servants and members of the Armed Forces because of their political convictions. In defense of public servants, who have the right to expect appreciation as a result of their work, we proclaim a fight against all forms of corruption and abuse of official authority.

#### **Free Press, Accurate Information**

The Socialist Party regards the press as one of the most important institutions for societal control. In its experience, the party may be independent from individual political parties, at most. In general, the private press reflects the interests of the person who finances a given medium, while the state's information media reflect the position of the prevailing government.

The Socialists do not endeavor to dissect the press on the basis of party principles. They regard as unacceptable the violation of personal rights and the illegal denigration of citizens. We reject coarseness, distasteful presentations, and pornography that appear in mass proportions in the press.

### **VIII. An Independent, Catalytic Foreign Policy!**

#### **All-European Cooperation**

The existence and development of Hungary is inseparable from the future of Europe. We, the Socialists, want Hungary to remain a catalyst in the historic reorganization of our continent, and in the liquidation of division.

Hungarian Socialists have done much to dismantle the symbolic and real walls, and for the sake of the free flow of people and ideas. With its preparedness to cooperate and its open foreign policy, Hungary has earned respect and appreciation in both the East and the West.

The Socialist Party wants to enhance cooperation among the small countries of Europe. It encourages cooperation in Central Europe, and the establishment of a free trade zone. We want to have a relationship with the Soviet Union, a country which has embarked on the path of reform, based on equal rights and mutual advantages.

Formulating our external conditions is not the government's monopoly. People's diplomacy, daily cooperation among unofficial organizations and people, may open new perspectives in the Europe of free nations.

#### **A Central Europe Composed of Free, Democratic States**

At the price of grave sacrifice, the populace of our country and of neighboring countries learned that they can be only losers in history if they go against each other. In the aftermath of the East-Central European changes of the most recent months, an opportunity to cooperate presents itself to the people of this region. Manifesting solidarity and understanding, it is possible to establish conditions for membership in a new Europe that is becoming unified.

In building these new relations, Hungarians residing beyond our borders may play an important role. Based on the principles contained in international agreements and in the Helsinki Accord, we stand up to protect their interests. The Socialist Party finds it necessary from the standpoint of all national minorities in the region for individual and collective minority rights and cultural autonomy to be secured, just as the freedom of relations with the mother country. We regard the culture of minorities residing in Hungary as our common treasure. We propose that a modern law concerning minorities provide for the rights of our minorities.

#### **A New European Security System**

As of today, the existence of alliance systems is a reality in Europe. On the other hand, it is a kind of reality which we must transcend gradually, by progressing toward a neutral status. The Socialist Party envisions realization of the future of the Hungarian Republic in a unified Europe free of blocs, in which threat is ruled out by mutual interstate guarantees. For this reason, the centerpiece of our security policy is the earliest possible disbanding of military alliances. In the meantime, we encourage the independence of national armies, and the defensive character of the Warsaw Pact.

It is our goal that all foreign military forces be removed from all countries, on a mutual basis, at a coordinated pace. Political and military strategic conditions favor our ambition that Hungary be among the first in this process. These are not just empty promises on the part of

Socialists. The Hungarian government is already conducting substantive negotiations with the Soviet Union in regard to this issue.

In Hungary the military forces must serve the nation's interests at all times. It is the determined view of the Socialist Party that, consistent with the European disarmament process, Hungarian military forces and armaments must be reduced.

The Socialist Party finds it necessary to convene another round of the Helsinki Conference, to review the radical changes in the European situation and the security issues. We urge that a 50 km demilitarized zone be established on both sides of our borders. We wish to see deeper international cooperation in the area along the border.

The Socialist Party endeavors to gradually dismantle the dividing wall between various trends within the left. In the course of our approach to Europe we wish to be full-fledged members of the large family of socialists.

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Free elections today have something historic at stake. A decision will be made on 25 March whether the era of uncertainty will permanently come to an end, and whether a firm and consistent government relying on a legitimate parliament and on the majority of the electorate will come into being. This test will also decide whether in the upcoming years the left will remain in the political arena with a substantial force, or if it will become even more splintered and fall apart into small groups incapable of acting.

Also at stake in the elections is whether the nation will survive the present crisis while carrying proportionate shares of the public burden, or, in case of a right-wing advance, all of the burden will fall on employed persons. The Socialist Party seeks the votes of the electorate so that unemployment and differences in social and cultural opportunities do not increase by dramatic proportions; so that working people do not become the passive subjects of history, instead of molding history.

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We, the Hungarian Socialists, persons of left-wing leanings, having suffered painful experiences and have learned our lessons from our own past. We realize that the country is facing difficult years, and that the time for empty promises has expired.

Renewed, as a constitutional party, in cooperation with all progressive forces, we participate in searching for the way out, in molding our country's future.

Budapest, 27 Jan 1990  
The Hungarian Socialist Party  
National Steering Committee

### Excerpts From January Platform

25000651 Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in  
Hungarian 13 Jan 90 p 73

[Unattributed article: "MSZP: Goals"]

[Text] Last week the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] published its economic policy endeavors. A few quotes:

"Our economy must become a socially oriented market economy. This means that, while recognizing the indispensability of the market, we do not proclaim the omnipotence of the market. The market is a less efficient organizing force, and it may even give rise to undesirable tensions in certain fields of social existence. For this reason, there is a place for a rich variety of forms of nonprofit oriented organization, built on the principle of solidarity."

"A reformed state direction must protect against the damaging effects of the market by using means available to the state, such as invigorating and regulating competition."

"We regard the broadening of private property as one of the indispensable moving forces of economic development, therefore the quantitative restriction of private property is not warranted. At the same time, we are against liberal endeavors which regard private ownership as the sole proprietary form that is rational from an economic standpoint."

"To foster the proliferation of small and medium-sized enterprises, and to strengthen the entrepreneurial character of large enterprises, it is necessary to develop a well considered government program."

"Entrepreneurship should become a citizen's right, and the entrepreneurial existence should be a realistic and societally accepted alternative for work and for making a living, available to everyone (who chooses to do so)."

"In the framework of our system of relationships the role of developed countries, primarily of the West European integration, will increase. At the same time we are counting on our CEMA partners in the long term, as sources of supplies needed by Hungary, and as the natural markets for Hungarian products."

"We want to see the activities of the active members of society, and the social services guaranteed by the state, jointly provide a decent livelihood for everyone. To accomplish this there is a need for job opportunities, for wages related to market conditions, and for social policies which provide security. We foster the protection of employee interests, and support trade union views which represent realistic employee interests."

"We urge the expansion of employment opportunities, retraining, and new starts, and the establishment of conditions for a natural workforce mobility. We regard the provision of jobs to persons who have just completed

their education as a special task. All of this requires a comprehensive governmental employment program."

"We endeavor to provide existential security to all citizens. It is our goal to provide elementary level existential security to citizens who are not vested in regard to social security, and who do not possess the means needed to pursue a stable life. It is our intent to prevent the accumulation of disadvantages, to prevent the reproduction of poverty, and to provide special services to those who find themselves in crisis situations."

### MSZP Ranks 4th in Preelection Poll

90EC0311A Budapest *MAGYAR NEMZET* in  
Hungarian 17 Feb 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by Agnes Bokor: "If the Elections Were Held This Coming Sunday ..."; Three Political Centers Begin To Take Shape"; first paragraph is *MAGYAR NEMZET* introduction]

[Text] The historic day is approaching: On 25 March there will be free elections once again in Hungary. Until that day, our weeks and days will be spent in the fever of party fights and political struggles; our nation brought up on something else is already tensely watching the excitement of being counted. But where and how? Where do we stand in terms of interpreting political processes and party strife? Who wants what, and who respects whom? Who is being trusted, whom do they believe? At our request, the Hungarian Public Opinion Research Institute will conduct three surveys and will prepare three analyses prior to the elections. It will present those surveys to us. In turn we will publish the surveys in order to provide our readers an opportunity to orient themselves as much as possible, together with interpretation and commentary by the well-known political scientist Mihaly Bihari. These publications will appear in approximately 10-day intervals.

Last year at this time most Hungarian citizens were thinking in terms of the conceptual opposite of "Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] yes or no?" They did not regard the "alternative" organizations as political alternatives. This outlook was slowly replaced by the dichotomy of "the communists or the opposition"? In this context the opposing parties were recognized at the beginning without distinguishing between the various organizations. Political events having effects on the masses and the outlining of party profiles were needed before the specifics within the two blocs were recognized. It was not before early 1990 that the question "which opposition party" became relevant to broader strata, and, as signs indicate, this is beginning to mature into the dilemma of choice between "the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] or the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]." Accordingly, public opinion's "change in color" may be seen in the fact that while earlier only the self-defined dimension of "communist-anticommunist" was comprehensible, it is likely that this

distinction yields to a choice between "populist-urban" trends, which by now have been transformed into political will.

All of this, however, is far from being this simple. As in earlier days (and everywhere), at present only the politically "alert" citizens relate more consciously to the political system, to its processes and actors. Accordingly, the above described way of thinking and thought formulation is characteristic primarily of these people—the upper one-fifth of society. For those who react to political events rather emotionally, and who do not even indirectly participate in bringing about such political events, the above trend appeared only with a delay, and only in a blurred fashion. There are still people, of course (the bottom one-third of society), in whose outlook on the world there is no room for polity. The difference today, as compared to the Kadar era, is that quite a few of those who live below the level of politics transferred to the silent, but observant majority, while many in the latter group have become members of the politically vocal, active social group.

Since we have witnessed the changes that have affected all European socialist countries to a lesser or greater extent, or rather to a huge extent, many feel that the Hungarian transformation is slow. But public opinion has become confused about the rapid pace of events. It takes an extraordinary effort on the part of the Hungarian populace accustomed to a sterile political environment to follow a much more complicated political life; to admit and to recognize that the opportunity to make a decision to define the country's perspectives and their own fate has been placed into their hands by virtue of announcing free elections. All of this was easy for informed, educated persons, but it was hardly so for those at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

Kadar's dismissal from his post as party executive secretary was the first understandable sign to the masses which indicated that the compromise between those in power and society was disintegrating, that there was a need for a first, as well as a second, economy and for openness, and that the schizophrenia of a society split into a "public" and a private sphere could be dissolved. But decades-old traits cannot be changed overnight, people continued not to think in terms of societal proportions when they were making guesses about the causes of the economic crisis and the deteriorating standard of living. At most they held the leaders responsible, not the system itself. A majority of the people were preoccupied with concerns about making ends meet, and whatever pointed beyond such concerns represented only a distant and uncertain promise. This, then, explains the people's ambivalent relationship to the initial phenomena of pluralism: They approved of the principles in general, but did not expect serious improvements as a result of realizing these principles.

In this regard, the lack of knowledge and the inability to orient oneself played the decisive role. Prior to mid-1989 only between 10 and 15 percent of the people stated that

there was a party which he or she was familiar with to a certain extent, but even these persons were not able to mention anything besides commonplace statements and tautology. The sweeping majority had unusually little knowledge of the elementary issues pertaining to the constitution and the election law being prepared. Public opinion followed political changes cautiously and with reservations. Although the 15 March demonstrations and the reassessment of 1956 prompted many persons to think, the belief that the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party would maintain its hegemony continued to dominate. Most frequently it was felt that this would be the most favorable outcome from the country's standpoint.

The line that marks the epochal change may be drawn perhaps around the time of Imre Nagy's funeral, and the death of Janos Kadar. Until then, the public did not really believe that there was a chance to build a fundamentally different social and political system. Until the summer of 1989 the question of which party's election victory would be desirable was irrelevant from the standpoint of the average citizen. Those unable to interpret this question were often motivated not by their convictions or by fear of something new, but by being accustomed to something, by the fact that it was inconceivable to expect a radical change, when they responded by mentioning the MSZMP. This may explain why until the fall of 1989 it was always this party that acquired a relative majority of votes in opinion polls, although in declining numbers.

Seemingly, in mature parliamentary democracies the consensus between those slated to exercise power and the citizens is reached in a single festive moment, when representatives are elected. All of this, however, is based on conditions. Voters are able to choose between political alternatives; parties have their own profiles and channel various kinds of political will; candidates who personify party programs provide liaison between organizations and voters as a matter of profession. The relationship between the three main actors in the political institutional system is in part codified, and in part based on custom with no less regulatory power. In contrast, in Hungary the conditions have begun to evolve only since the middle of last year.

The National Roundtable which functioned from May to September was supposed to fill this hiatus. Because of the sparsity of information, and informational aptitudes which have not evolved, the public did not recognize the caliber of these negotiations. The unified stand of the opposition, however, was appropriate in the situation, not only in the sense that they were able to define themselves as being opposed to the state party, but also in terms of being able to reflect public thought: At that point a majority of the people were able to distinguish only between "the opposition" and "the communists." In simultaneous party slate election situations presented in opinion polls, a larger section of the people have been firm since the beginning of the year on whether they do or do not want to vote for the MSZMP. A majority of

those who did not want to vote for the MSZMP, however, chose between opposition organizations on the basis of momentary mood or by being attracted by the name of a party, for at least half a year. Multiple appearances in the mass communication media, actions that drew attention, were needed before individual parties, the Hungarian Democratic Forum first, were able to emerge in the middle or lower regions of the social hierarchy, from the "mass of opposition" that appeared to have only a single color.

The October MSZ(M)P congress manifested the division in the former state party; and the revival of the MSZMP dissolved the illusion of the unity of the political force that confronts the opposition. The public pinned great hopes on the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] as long as it believed that the MSZP's establishment would produce instant, spectacular results. This is why the Socialists received most votes immediately following the congress at which the party rift occurred. These hopes proved to be excessive, however, and lead to disappointment. In late 1989 the MSZP began its low altitude flight.

As a result of the ill-matched closing of the trilateral bargaining process, even the unity of the opposition disintegrated. The public sensed this through the campaign that was waged in the interest of providing a "proper" answer to the issue of whether a popular referendum should be called, and in relation to a question concerning the election of the president of the republic. The Alliance of Free Democrats became the real winner of the popular referendum; the number of votes cast for the SZDSZ in opinion polls tripled or quadrupled as compared to the number of votes cast half a year earlier. The effect of Duna-Gate can also be shown: It strengthened the position of the Free Democrats, and weakened that of the Socialists. The front runners emerged from among more than 50 parties by early 1990, those six or eight political organizations which will occupy seats in Parliament. We can be almost certain that from among all the parties four parties, the MDF, the SZDSZ, the Independent Smallholders [FKgP], and the MSZP, will receive enough mandates to become definitive forces in Parliament.

Before the election campaign began, a quarter of the future voters pondered which party to vote for on 25 March. Nevertheless, 70 percent of these future voters were able to choose on the basis of a list placed in front of them. Every fifth person reached a decision not to vote, and two-thirds of the people thought in those days that they would take part in what would become the first free election for most of them. The propaganda campaign is likely to modify the perceptions that evolved up to that point. But we may not expect to see the greatest change in the inclination to participate in the elections, nor in regard to voter orientation. These factors have more or less taken shape, to the extent that the brevity of time has permitted. But we should not regard the present ranking of the parties based on public opinion research as final, and we should not think that the motivating

factors of voter behavior will be identical with regard to individual candidates and parties.

For the time being, people are still much more firm with regard to the matter of which party they dislike and which organizations they would not support with their votes. Most people waver between two or three parties, and a campaign that turns out to be good or bad may reduce this uncertainty.

The moment of truth will arrive soon—not on 25 March, of course, because most certainly in many places a single round of elections will not be sufficient to distribute the mandates. The unprecedented complex, and in more than one respect defective, election law will be put to the test, and the parties will be sized up. And in the end it is still the citizen who will be put to the test and appraised: It will be apparent whether they have prepared themselves to grab this opportunity which can change their fortunes. The knowledge of individuals is extremely fragmented, but combined into "collective wisdom" it

will perhaps express the public will. For the time being, barely half of the people have been informed of the fact that they may vote for individual candidates as well as for parties, and not even half of the individual parties' voters know who the politician is who leads the party which he is most inclined to vote for.

The level of awareness is even lower concerning party programs, the programs of individual candidates who are making their appearances just now, and coalition programs. As the "great day(s)" approaches, elementary information will be spread at an accelerating pace, and voters will be increasingly motivated to accept it. But it would be an unlikely assumption to think that at the ballot box only the knowledge-based, conscious considerations will serve as a basis for making decisions. According to realistic calculations, the actual situation will be the opposite: The election outcome will be determined by the mark made on the ballot form by about 3 million voters guided by feelings derived from historical and social experience, which are hard to explain on a rational basis.

**If the election were held this coming Sunday and the candidates of these parties were to run, which party would you vote for? (Jun-Sep 1989)**

Ratio of persons voting for the more significant parties as compared to the number of persons questioned (q) and the number of respondents (r)								
	Jun 1989		Jul 1989		Aug 1989		Sep 1989	
	q	r	q	r	q	r	q	r
Association of Young Democrats (FIDESZ)	6	9	5	7	5	7	9	11
Independent Smallholders Party (FKgP)	6	8	8	11	7	9	6	7
Independent Hungarian Democratic Party (FMDP)	9	13	3	4	6	8	4	5
Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP)	2	3	2	2	3	3	3	4
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)	8	12	10	14	14	18	19	24
Hungarian Independence Party (MFP)	4	6	3	5	3	4	3	4
Hungarian People's Party (MNP)	4	6	3	4	2	3	2	3
Social Democratic Party of Hungary (MSZDP)	7	10	8	10	6	8	6	8
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP)	19	28	27	37	24	32	19	23
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Hungarian Green Party (MZIP)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)	3	5	2	3	4	5	5	6
Other parties	0	0	2	3	2	3	4	5
Did not vote	32	—	27	—	24	—	20	—

Sample size: 1,000 persons. Those questioned represent the adult population of the country.

**If the election were held this coming Sunday and the candidates of these parties were to run, which party would you vote for? (Oct 1989-Jan 1990)**

Ratio of persons voting for the more significant parties as compared to the number of persons questioned (q) and the number of respondents (r)								
	Oct 1989		Nov 1989		Dec 1989		Jan 1990	
	q	r	q	r	q	r	q	r
Association of Young Democrats (FIDESZ)	7	8	9	13	6	8	5	7
Independent Smallholders Party (FKgP)	4	5	7	9	10	12	11	16
Independent Hungarian Democratic Party (FMDP)	3	3	3	4	3	4	3	4
Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP)	4	5	3	4	2	3	2	3



**If the election were held this coming Sunday and the candidates of these parties were to run,  
which party would you vote for? (Oct 1989-Jan 1990) (Continued)**

Ratio of persons voting for the more significant parties as compared to the number of persons questioned (q) and the number of respondents (r)								
	Oct 1989		Nov 1989		Dec 1989		Jan 1990	
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)	21	27	15	22	18	23	15	21
Hungarian Independence Party (MFP)	2	2	2	3	2	2	0	0
Hungarian People's Party (MNP)	2	2	2	3	3	4	2	2
Social Democratic Party of Hungary (MSZDP)	3	4	6	8	4	6	3	5
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP)	4	6	5	7	4	5	3	4
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)	20	25	11	16	12	16	8	11
Hungarian Green Party (MZIP)	0	1	1	2	2	2	1	2
Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)	7	9	6	8	11	14	13	18
Other parties	2	3	0	1	1	1	5	7
Did not vote	21	—	30	—	22	—	29	—

Sample size: 1,000 persons. Those questioned represent the adult population of the country.

### State Security Stool Pigeon at FIDESZ Reveals Himself

25000660C Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian  
17 Feb 90 p 9

[Interview with Geza Kovacs, former Interior Ministry agent, by Attila Csarnai at the FIDESZ office in Esztergom: "The Secret Reports of a Covert Agent: 'Sign Here; From Now on You Are Part of State Security'"; date of interview not given]

[Text] When a young man seated in the first row walked up to the microphone, it created a great sensation at the FIDESZ [Association of Democratic Youth] press conference. He announced that until the middle of December he had been an agent of the Ministry of the Interior, but that he had had enough of gathering information. I met the young man, 21-year-old Geza Kovacs, at the FIDESZ office in Esztergom.

[NEPSZAVA] How long have you served in the Interior Ministry?

[Kovacs] For three years. I was 18 when I started, and I played in an orchestra. Otherwise I am a technician; I worked here in Esztergom.

[NEPSZAVA] At the press conference you said that they recruited you through extortion. How?

[Kovacs] I was the leader, and at the same time the singer of the ensemble. The police did not like the lyrics of our songs. In general, these songs dealt with political and social issues.

[NEPSZAVA] Give me an example!

[Kovacs] The refrain in one of the songs said: "I don't know for how long; you have not been thinking about work; you're not thinking and you're not acting; you are looking for an alibi and you get lost."

### Meeting at the Dock

[NEPSZAVA] Where did you perform this?

[Kovacs] At the cultural home. They permitted us to perform, because they did not know what it was all about. But the trouble started after the first performance; I received a summons to the police. They told me that the walls in the city were scribbled all over with the ensemble's name: "Zsenti." Already at that time it seemed odd that at the Esztergom police they took me at once to the second floor, to an office. They did not say anything unusual, we just conversed. Thereafter I received a new summons; that time the trouble clearly concerned the lyrics of the songs. They told me that we were inciting youth. On another occasion they questioned me about what persons visited the club. I knew the people well, because I was the leader of the club. The police told me that they would like to know some more about young alcoholics, drug users, because if I gave them such information I would be helping to protect youth. I did not suspect their real intent.

[NEPSZAVA] What was the next step?

[Kovacs] I was told to meet them at the dock, rather than at the police station. They told me that this way they would not have to issue a summons. They asked me to give them a diary which included the nicknames, occupations, and friends of the young people. I went to the meeting and handed over the diary.

[NEPSZAVA] Did you not have a bad conscience?

[Kovacs] I had.... But they told me they were looking for drug users. At most, two out of the 100 youths used drugs occasionally, of course.

[NEPSZAVA] Whom did you meet at the dock?

[Kovacs] First Lieutenant Balazs Szabo, but this was only a pseudonym. I never learned his real name. He did not even reside in Esztergom.

[NEPSZAVA] At what point did it turn out that you were actually an agent?

[Kovacs] In 1988. They called me to the police station, and based on witness accounts they said that we were the ones who had scribbled on the walls. They wanted to initiate a rule violations proceeding. But they also told me instantly that the diary I had given them was good. At that point Balazs Szabo pushed a piece of paper in front of me and told me to read it and to give thorough consideration to what was written there. They even left the room. The writing said that beginning on that day I was part of the state security service ... and that I would protect socialist achievements. It's hard to remember.... It also stated that I was not supposed to talk about it, not even to my parents, otherwise I would be committing a crime.

**The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] Is Not Interesting**

[NEPSZAVA] What happened then?

[Kovacs] They told me that I had better sign it. They reassured me that I would not have any trouble as a result. And meanwhile I was worried that they would initiate a rules violation proceeding against me.

[NEPSZAVA] Did you ask any questions?

[Kovacs] None. I was just thinking ... and I signed. Then they laughed when they told me that there would be no rules violation proceeding whatsoever.

[NEPSZAVA] Did they give you any assignments?

[Kovacs] At first I wrote a resume, then they gave me a pseudonym: Attila Budai. Then they told me that they would meet me once a month. At the railroad station, for instance, or in front of the Cathedral. They were interested in everything. Criminal activities, or, for example, where the workers wanted to strike.

[NEPSZAVA] How many times and with whom did you meet thereafter?

[Kovacs] I always met with Balazs Szabo. I wrote 10 reports in the course of 23 months. I was permitted to write these before the meetings, and was supposed to hand them over in envelopes. One time I was unable to appear at the prearranged place due to illness. Balazs Szabo instantly wrote me a letter, at this time using my pseudonym Attila Budai, asking when the next concert would be held. This meant that he wanted to know when and where we could meet again.

[NEPSZAVA] What was of primary interest to the police at that time?

[Kovacs] Politics became of increasing interest. Last summer, for example, they wanted to know what FIDESZ leader Tamas Deutsch was doing in Esztergom, whom he met, who attended his presentation.

[NEPSZAVA] Were they asking questions about the organization?

[Kovacs] Yes; actually they were interested in every party.

[NEPSZAVA] Also in the MSZMP and later in the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]?

[Kovacs] They were not interested in those parties.

[NEPSZAVA] Were they otherwise satisfied with your work?

[Kovacs] Balazs Szabo did not have anything to say.

[NEPSZAVA] What kind of compensation did you receive for your activities?

[Kovacs] On one occasion they gave me 2,000 forints. A police patrolman gave me a summons to pay a 1,000-forint fine because he found my personal identification card to be wrinkled. They gave me the other 1,000 forints to buy samizdat newspapers. Szabo told me that they would fix my cases if I had any trouble with the police.

[NEPSZAVA] Accordingly you did not receive a lot of money....

[Kovacs] And I wasn't too ardent about my work either.

[NEPSZAVA] How are you reconciling with your conscience?

[Kovacs] I should not have signed that paper. But I never gave them any special information. I hope that no one got into trouble because of me, aside from a few criminals.

**How Many Are Left?**

[NEPSZAVA] What assignment did you receive last fall?

[Kovacs] I was told in November to join FIDESZ, but I had already done so in August, because I sincerely sympathized with them. They did not know about this.... They asked me to obtain information, to find out who was being listened to. They did not like those with a "bloody mouth" who wanted to see a change in the regime too quickly. I met Szabo for the last time on 13 December. I was supposed to observe a young man who was a librarian, but I could not bring myself to do that.

[NEPSZAVA] Why?

[Kovacs] I had had enough of the whole thing.

[NEPSZAVA] So suddenly?

[Kovacs] I wanted to stop doing this, but I was scared. Then in January the wiretapping scandal was unveiled. And I started talking to Janos Pal Knapp, leader of the FIDESZ Esztergom circle. I made a detailed confession about what I was doing. We were quiet about this matter for a time, because in those days FIDESZ was busy with the Romanian events. On the other hand, on 17 January I did not go to the prearranged meeting with Szabo.

[NEPSZAVA] As an agent, were you asked to provide information only?

[Kovacs] Yes, that was my only assignment.

[NEPSZAVA] And others?

[Kovacs] I know nothing about that.

[NEPSZAVA] How well did you know the agent network?

[Kovacs] Szabo once told me that there were many. I knew that in every county there were between eight and ten officers like Szabo operating, and each oversaw about 10 people. They met me once a month, but they met with others weekly, or daily. But we did not know about each other. Throughout the country there are about 2,000 stool pigeons like this. I was not the only one in Esztergom either.

[NEPSZAVA] Aren't you scared now?

[Kovacs] I noticed during the days after the press conference that I was being followed. But nothing has happened since. Incidentally, FIDESZ is providing me legal protection.

#### **Excerpt from MDF Platform: Protection of Minorities**

90A10192B Budapest SZOMBAT in Hungarian  
Jan 90 pp 4-5

[Unattributed article: "Protection of Minorities; Excerpts from the MDF Platform Adopted in October 1989"]

[Text] In the framework of Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] policies designed to protect minorities, we must address our Jewish countrymen separately. Since we support the principle by which a person should be free to proclaim his identity, we are pleased that an increasing number of Jews residing in Hungary regard it as their duty to nurture the values of traditional Jewish religious life and culture in the strengthening Hungarian democracy.

Even in these days, two circumstances continue to exert a paralyzing effect upon the harmonious coexistence of Jews and non-Jews. One is the fact of the 1944 Holocaust, and in conjunction with that there is the fact that the question asked by Istvan Bibó—our responsibility in regard to what took place—does not yet occupy an appropriate place in our common thought, one that would be commensurate with the historic weight of that event. (It is no explanation, but it is the stark truth that considering the enlarged territory of the country, in addition to the annihilation of almost 600,000 Jews, additional hundreds of thousands had to die in the course of World War II, and these horrible losses in human lives are not appropriately reflected in our national consciousness.)

Also in regard to our Jewish countrymen we regard as valid those statements of the MDF Ethical Proclamation according to which "the MDF is endeavoring to achieve

reconciliation even at the cost of conflicts, at the international, national, and local levels. Twentieth Century Hungarian history is the history of reckoning, in which the nation was the greatest loser. The MDF also organized itself in the interest of preventing yet another reckoning, because it is convinced that revenge only produces more revenge. In contrast, in the spirit of forgiving and conciliation, the MDF endeavors to discontinue unjust structures, rather than to reckon with people."

Keeping the past in mind, with our eyes fixed on the present and the future, the MDF is laboring on the following program of action:

—Consistent with a proposal made at the First MDF National Rally, in agreement with all concerned parties, we wish to remember the World War II victims of Hungary. Let us remember our fellow Jewish and Gypsy human beings destroyed at Auschwitz and in other death camps; let us recall those who died at the battlefield, in prisoner of war camps, and in forced labor camps, as well as the civilian victims of the war.

—Following the example set by the Kiskunmajsa MDF, as many as possible MDF organizations (jointly with the Democratic Forum of Youth) should join in repairing local Jewish cemeteries.

—In a similar spirit, MDF working groups having jurisdiction should participate in restoring abandoned Jewish religious buildings (synagogues), and in their renovation in a way that will not offend religious reverence.

—The MDF proposes that in 1994, at the latest (the 50th anniversary of the deportations), monuments be erected in public places to commemorate the victims. Costs should be covered from contributions made by the public.

—The MDF is not satisfied with condemning anti-Semitism in principle. It regards as important that the Jewry, with all of its religious and cultural representations, develop productive working relationships which extend to mutual publications in one another's media, presentations at each other's functions, and jointly organized events and ceremonies for remembrance.

—In the interest of building a better future, we should start cooperation between our youth groups on as broad a basis as possible, and as soon as possible.

The MDF is laboring on the construction of a Hungary and a Central Europe in which no one has to be afraid as a result of his ethnic or religious affiliation, or as a result of the natural profession of such affiliation.

## Statements on Csurka Broadcast Affair Presented

### Csurka Defends Position

90A10193A Szekszard DATUM in Hungarian  
26 Jan 90 p 8

[Interview with Istvan Csurka, by Hajnalka Cseke: "Istvan Csurka Makes a Statement: 'I Attacked Those in Power'"; date and place not given]

[Text] [DATUM] Your note broadcast on the Radio's 14 January VASARNAPI UJSAG evoked lively response. Various professional and political groups attacked you in the press, and they used more or less the same arguments to distance themselves from your writing. Your open letter familiarized us with your response to the accusations. But we did not learn what is behind these attacks. Is this an attack on you personally, or is the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] the target?

[Csurka] I believe that both are involved. Quite naturally, the attack is primarily against my person. That does not matter. What outrages me and makes me think is that certain individuals are speaking on behalf of persons and sentiments whom and which I never offended! Persons in power have the audacity to speak for the former victims, the former survivors, and for the ones who were truly offended at one time, to defend them against me, but these are the ones I never harmed. This is an extremely immoral situation. I attacked those in power! Those who hold power, those who did not bother to at least distance themselves from the activities they had pursued in the previous year by apologizing. All of those who prompted, served, and created this Hungarian moral crisis were there in the television and the press of the Kadar-Aczel system. The fact that the nation finds itself in its present state of affairs, the fact that it can be manipulated easily, the fact that everything can be turned inside out so easily, may be credited mostly to the comrades, the commentators, and the editors in chief for prompting this situation. They never said a word when they should have stood up for a Hungarian cause! They are capable of forming a battle line on the grounds of accusations which were misinterpreted and based on a few adjectives. They are capable of bringing all of Hungary's public life into ill repute, and of raising the specter of things that do not exist! These threats become real if this vile spitefulness continues.

[DATUM] Is there some agitation against the MDF involved?

[Csurka] Yes, of course. After all, one of our political opponents is the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]. One of their managers began this hunt, so as to detach me from the MDF. The day after the note was broadcast, MAGYAR HIRLAP wrote that the MDF must think about the question of whether it wants to continue to cooperate with Csurka, or if they will sever their relations with him. On the following day there appeared a caricature which showed that they wanted to eject me from the MDF balloon. Guided by a deliberate interest,

they are suggesting to public opinion that the MDF get rid of me because I represent a burden. According to a statement made by Miklos Haraszti, I am a time machine, and I am returning the MDF to 1938. What he forgot is that 1938 was the last year of peace. And if I could accomplish that, many passengers from today's Hungary would join me, even though I do not want to return anyone to that year!

It is apparent that a method, Bolshevik by nature, is in the background of these events. Whoever has lived somewhat longer and recalls the Bolsheviks' political history will be able to compare this situation with the Bolshevik methods the Communists used between 1945 and 1947 to smash the Smallholders Party. They picked out individuals and stigmatized them: He is a reactionary, he is a right winger. And the Smallholders had to get rid of their right wing; they had to get rid of persons who represented a "reactionary burden."

It was always Rakosi who said whom they did not like. And it was always something in the tone of voice which he did not like. In the end this resulted in a situation in which Ferenc Nagy emigrated, and Bela Kovacs was exiled to Siberia. We are at the same point today! And these gentlemen are the heroes of democracy, the ones who interfere with another party's life in this manner and want to define in the future what can be said and in what way.

Quite naturally, they feel authorized to determine in this world free of censorship what is permitted to be said. The trouble is that those who cooperate with this outlook and with these people were the leading personalities of the press and television of the Kadar era just yesterday. One of these has temporarily lost his job now, and this is why this whole circus began; it started for no other reason. The cooperation between these two groups rests on the same basic principle that served as the principle for censorship and for the political direction of the press under the Kadar system. Whoever is not on this platform must think twice about how he writes, because if he does not write in the "appropriate" way they will start a concentrated attack like this against him.

[DATUM] Did they succeed in detaching you from the MDF?

[Csurka] With the concurrence of the presidium I drafted the statement in which the MDF regards my note as part of my activities as a writer, because that's what it is. Whenever I have spoken on behalf of the MDF I have always announced that fact in advance. No one announced that Istvan Csurka was speaking on behalf of the MDF before reading the note.

For example, the premiere performance of the play "Dead Mines" took place the day before yesterday. Was that play performed in the name of the MDF? I would be badly off if it was. I have been a writer for 30 years. And the MDF is not the one who gave me my standing as a writer. Nevertheless, there are some who want to tie my work as a writer to issues of party politics.

[DATUM] We are in the final hours before the system changes. And in this fighting political situation you are still identified with the MDF, irrespective of how long you have pursued a writing career. Could these accusations cause a loss of prestige to the MDF?

[Csurka] It is possible to make temporary gains as a result of a slander campaign. After all, a system like that has existed for 40 years, and it has always registered "success," and our lives which were constructed and were made more beautiful always "progressed." It was built and beautified until we came to the brink of ruin. This will suffer the same fate! They will harvest for a while, and then suddenly it will come to an end.

### **SZDSZ on Broadcast**

90A10193B Budapest MAI NAP in Hungarian  
31 Jan 90 p 7

[Interview with Alliance of Free Democrats Manager Janos Kis by Peter Kurucz: "Csurka, Who Could Not Be Bridled, Spoiled the Relationship; The Grace Period of Expectations Has Expired"; date and place not given]

[Text] At the invitation of the American foreign affairs institute, a delegation lead by Jozsef Antall traveled to the United States. This is what the brief announcement that appeared in yesterday's newspapers had to say. Our editorial office learned that the invitation was addressed not only to the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], but also to the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats]. Although initially the SZDSZ accepted the invitation, they did not want to take advantage of it. This is the first time that the SZDSZ has made a statement on this matter, specifically with regard to Csurka's writing. SZDSZ manager Janos Kis:

[Kis] The ominous Csurka text, which, in addition to various persons and social strata, also targeted the SZDSZ, was broadcast two weeks ago on the radio program VASARNAPI UJSAG. Csurka attacked us using a coarse tone of voice that bordered upon slander. We were counting on the MDF presidium to delimit itself from Csurka's attacks, whose tone of voice cannot be described. This did not take place, however; moreover, Jozsef Antall defended him on behalf of the presidium. After Antall defended Csurka we decided that we could not travel to the United States together with representatives of the MDF.

[MAI NAP] But Csurka's writing came about during the period when the two parties had begun to approach one another, and this projected the possibility of a future government which rests on broader foundations. How do you explain the unexpected turnaround?

[Kis] After the call to boycott the popular referendum failed, the MDF leaders moderated the tone of voice by which they talked about us, and one could count on normalizing the relationship between the two of us. By this I mean that Jozsef Antall himself stated in MAI NAP, for example, that we are political rivals, but we must become

each other's loyal competing partners who observe the rules of the game, as is done in democracies. The Csurka statement unexpectedly disrupted this normalizing process. Originally we attributed this to Csurka's uncontrollable temper and hoped that the MDF would manifest itself. To this date I do not understand why this has not taken place, why the MDF does not find it necessary to present its organization to the country as a reliable, civilized party. I would also add that we were silent for a long time, particularly in the interest of acquiescence, and did not react in any way to Csurka's unqualified tone of voice.

[MAI NAP] Does this mean that the grace period has now been disrupted?

[Kis] We found ourselves in a situation in which we were forced to take a position, so that the public would not believe that a false agreement was reached under the veil of the curse accorded to us. But we did not lose our patience, and we do not wish to adopt the tone of voice used by Csurka.

[MAI NAP] According to what you say, it is more important for the MDF to retain Csurka in its leadership than to retain the relationship it has with the MDF.

[Kis] We were not the only ones attacked by Csurka. He also indiscriminately attacked all kinds of political personalities and social groups. Particularly for this reason I regard it as a mistake that the MDF did not delimit itself from the statement. A political party which in today's extremely tense atmosphere permits one of its leading representatives to make an irresponsible, inciting speech, bears grave responsibility for the poisoned public mood. I would once again add that we did not rush to publicize our views; we did not want to create a semblance that the MDF leadership would stand up against Csurka in response to pressure exerted by us.

[MAI NAP] What does the future hold?

[Kis] We do not see it clearly. We entered a constrained situation. We do not want to appear in the company of the MDF delegation. I am nevertheless confident that within the MDF leadership a sense of responsibility for the nation and a sober mind will gain the upper hand.

[MAI NAP] Have you not buried the hatchet as far as you are concerned?

[Kis] That is out of the question.

### **Social Democratic Party Platform Highlights**

25000650H Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 13 Jan 90 p 72

[Unattributed article: "SZDP: Proposing a Path"]

[Text] This week the Social Democratic Party of Hungary [SZDP] publicized its—we quote—"brief program" entitled "Social Democracy: the Path to Europe." Here are a few segments of the program:

"In a manner different from communists, Social Democrats do not endeavor to establish a 'perfect society.' Social Democracy is 'satisfied' with being able to secure freedom, justice, life without fear, and prosperity without want to people.

"Only an all-encompassing change in the system can uplift the country from the deep point it is at now.

"We advocate a kind of liberal socialism based on societal solidarity, the kind that has evolved in Sweden, Finland, and Austria.

"Social Democracy cannot promise an instant economic upswing, and it cannot promise higher wages and a higher standard of living overnight.

"Economic performance, human dignity, and an endeavor to reconcile societal solidarity are our basic principles. The path that leads to this is the performance principle, competition, efficiency, a free market in production, judiciousness, solidarity, and a social policy based on distribution guaranteed by the state.

"A radical reform of proprietary conditions is the most urgent task in formulating a social market economy. An economy capable of functioning is inconceivable without an owner making responsible decisions. On the other hand, in our view proprietary reform must not mean general privatization.

"Proprietary reform cannot be delayed in agriculture either. Social Democrats approve of and support the idea of private land ownership by the peasantry. The evolution and strengthening of viable family farms must be enhanced, even through state subsidies.

"We want employees and their interest representation organs to participate in decisionmaking at the plant-enterprise level. Relative to the institutions of the marketplace, functioning institutions for plant workers' self-governance and social partnership must be developed. Together with free labor unions based on trades, it is the task of these institutions to stand up against exploitation practiced by both the state and private capital.

"Social Democracy supports a social policy based on the redistribution of income ensured by the state. An economy based on market principles and social policies not based on market principles are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary ... they complement each other and correct each other's functional shortcomings. The basic social policy principle of Social Democrats is to ensure, as a matter of citizens' rights, for everyone a living that befits a human being at every stage and in every situation of life. Above all, efforts must be made to develop a pension system capable of ensuring a peaceful old age free of want, one that preserves the purchasing power of pensions. A decent unemployment assistance system must be developed, with particular attention paid to persons seeking jobs at the beginning of their careers. The opportunity to acquire housing on the basis of social considerations must be broadened substantially."

### Social Democrats Challenge Mortgage Interest Tax in Court

25000650C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
25 Jan 90 p 6

[Text] We regard provisions which tax the interest paid after low interest state housing loans as unconstitutional, therefore we filed a legal challenge with the Constitutional Court, according to attorney Endre Borbely, one of the vice chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary [MSZDP], at a press conference held yesterday at the party's Dohany Street headquarters. [quotation marks omitted in original]

The MSZDP believes that, pursuant to the Constitution, taxes may be assessed only on income and property. In essence, the tax on interest does not tax income or property, it taxes indebtedness. The decree approved by the National Assembly at its December session represents a unilateral change in the terms of a contract, according to Borbely. This step taken by the state may shake confidence in the state. For this reason the MSZDP's so-called call for civil disobedience should be regarded as valid, meaning that persons affected by these provisions should not pay taxes on interest, the party vice chairman added.

Anna Petrasovits told the press conference that during her two-day stay in Japan she met leaders of the Democratic Socialist Party and the Japanese Socialist Party. Great interest was manifested in the East European changes, and within that in the ongoing democratization process in Hungary, according to the party chairwoman.

The MSZDP chairwoman dealt with the relationship between the party and, as she said, the trade union movement, which is in the process of renewing itself. Petrasovits termed branch trade unions the strategic allies of social democrats, just as she regards the "independent" trade unions as strategic allies. She stressed that the MSZDP did not want to take a position with regard to the ongoing dispute between the Independent Coordinating Council and the League of Independent Trade Unions over trade union assets. She regarded the fact that several social democratic candidates running in the upcoming elections enjoy the support of certain branch trade unions as a positive development. With reference to the League, she said that from the standpoint of social democrats it is unimportant when a trade union was formed and how many members it has. Of importance is the extent to which they are independent from parties and from the "economic oligarchy." The chairwoman said that the MSZDP supports the protest demonstration scheduled for next week by the steel workers union.

Gabor Szilagyi said that he visited the Soviet Union between 12 and 16 January. He met with representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee, and paid a visit to two Baltic republics where he conferred with local social democratic party leaders.

### **'Independent' Social Democrats Move Closer to Communists**

25000650F Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
6 Feb 90 p 4

[Interviews with Ferenc Kitzinger, Independent Social Democratic Party managing chairman, and Rezso Nyers, Hungarian Socialist Party chairman, including text of Kitzinger letter to Nyers: "Independent Social Democrats Approach Socialists; Cooperating While Preserving Independence"; dates and places of interviews not given]

[Text] Not too long ago Ferenc Kitzinger, the managing chairman of the Independent Social Democratic Party, wrote to Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] Chairman Rezso Nyers. After 1956 the Social Democratic politician conducted his activities in Belgium with [former Social Democratic Party Chairwoman] Anna Kethly. In his letter he expressed his party's views regarding several domestic policy issues. We asked Kitzinger why he felt it was necessary to establish contact with Nyers.

[Kitzinger] I was stunned to read the Socialist Party's proclamation of 20 January in which it requests that representatives of the rest of the parties once again sit down at the negotiating table. I read the proclamation with understanding sympathy. Based on analyses prepared by my party's experts, and on my convictions, I find that in the present situation the Independent Social Democratic Party and the Socialist Party have produced almost identical results. I feel that as a social democrat and a person active in public life I am obligated to take a position in regard to all issues which may endanger the peaceful transition segment of our democratization process. Thank God, our party and its leaders have not lost their sense to make sober judgments. Sober judgment has characterized them ever since we established the party. Having taken this into consideration, and hoping that Rezso Nyers will value our position, we wrote to the chairman of the MSZP.

#### **Text of Kitzinger Letter to Nyers**

"The increasingly odd and incomprehensible manifestations of our political public life prompt us to provide a firm and clear response to all those actual and perceived forces which, while emphasizing that they are laboring on building a fundamentally changed social structure, prove the opposite because in many instances they are guided by transparent personal and political interest. These parties and their leaders disregard the sad and tragic period of history we lived through, and would like to make millions of Hungarian people believe that with all their loudness and declarations they are serving the interest of the people's salvation. They do so as self-appointed representatives and with a posture suggesting that they represent salvation to the world. One may hope that on 25 March this error will be exchanged for a recognition which renders the legitimacy of a further role in public life and the right to play such a role a clear-cut issue. Due to our peculiar situation, we, the Independent Social Democrats, have never denied on which side we

stand. Even at this time we are acutely aware of what our tasks are in a struggle which demands decency. An attempt to expropriate this struggle is being made by forces in the name of the spiritually, morally, and financially destroyed people, forces which would like to burden our shoulders with their dreams, and who regard politics as a gentleman's pastime, while governing the people from above. On the other hand, Hungarian workers are smart. This fact may be seen in the conduct of the masses, which is free of excesses, even though their warning encouragement to us is increasing in strength: Let us become convinced, let us defeat our inability to act which stems from a lack of faith, and finally, let us prove ourselves with actions. Let us force the government to make well founded decisions which render tolerable the pressure that has descended upon us as a result of our adverse economic situation. An increasingly poor community of workers is becoming incapable of making the efforts that are expected of it, and therefore all political forces must issue a command to halt all adventurist endeavors conceived in an experimental mood, irrespective of whether these are cloaked as party or government representatives. Confidence may be acquired only by one who practices, and supports with results, what he preaches. We are in no mood to play the role of the sacrificial lamb for another 33 years, and to become tools in the hands of those who expropriate value producing work and wish to satisfy only their own selfish financial interests. Let us establish cooperation based upon solidarity with all forces which secure a passable way for the millions to progress upon, while keeping in mind the true interests of the nation, with those who today, with tears in their eyes swallow the increasingly bitter pills provided by the government, which only serve to prolong recovery. The time has come to establish a Hungarian national 'rescue council,' in which joint responsibility determines the actions to be taken in the upcoming period."

We asked Rezso Nyers his opinion of the Independent Social Democracy Party managing chairman's letter.

[Nyers] I am very pleased that our proclamation was well received by the Independent Social Democrats, and that, in a manner not unlike in December, we will once again hold a national summit with the participation of party representatives. In my view the existence and functioning of this party signals that pathfinding which goes on in Hungarian political life to make social democratic values prevail. Personally I like the existence of a party such as the Socialist Party, because in a certain sense our party may also be perceived as having a social democratic character. Socialism and social democracy do not yet have ready answers to all of the most urgent issues facing today's Hungarian society. We have better chances of doing something good to uplift the working people, the people, if we seek responses jointly. It would be beneficial if this search for contacts within the Hungarian Left were to appear on a broader scale. I find it important that along with the preservation of independence an inclination to cooperate gains strength.

[NEPSZABADSAG] You were invited by Kitzinger to pay a visit to the Independent Social Democratic Party's headquarters on Paulay Ede Street.

[Nyers] We will pay them a visit as soon as possible. We will clarify in what respects we are practically identical in terms of a platform, and what things we see differently. The strength of the Left is also shown by the fact that we have alternative views with regard to daily political issues. I particularly welcome the fact that the Independent Social Democratic Party considers itself in public to be a left-of-center party.

[NEPSZABADSAG] They dare to accept the fact that they are left-wing, and that is a rarity in these days.

[Nyers] Yes, and we are prepared to cooperate with them. We do not insist upon rigid forms, nor do we insist upon defining whether we wish to cooperate before or after the elections.

#### **Court Upholds Use of Name 'Smallholders' by Dissident Party**

*25000650G Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
10 Feb 90 p 4*

[Unattributed article: "Two Smallholders in the Same Tavern..."]

[Text] The Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party has filed suit against the National Smallholders and Bourgeois Party. It has requested that the court prohibit the latter from using the name "Smallholders." The case came before the judicial council chaired by Dr. Istvan Fuzessy at the Szeged City Court.

On behalf of the complainant attorney, Dr. Tibor Sasvari and Managing Vice Chairman Dr. Gyorgy Balogh argued that in a legal sense, their party may be regarded as having operated since 1930, because no one discontinued the operations of, or dissolved, the party. The party's bylaws indicate that they would use the term "Smallholders Party" as an abbreviation. This is a dominant element in the full name of the party; it evolved historically and it is attractive and well established. As proof they submitted for the record the flyers submitted by the defendant, in which they stressed the term "smallholder" with capital letters. In their view, the other party is attempting to forge election capital out of this historic name.

The National Smallholders and Bourgeois party conveyed its views through attorney Dr. Istvan Baba, a member of the party's operative committee. In their view, in this case the term "smallholder" represents a stratum of the population which pursues an identical activity, whose representation the complainant has no authority to prohibit. There are also identical terms in the names of other parties; an avalanche of lawsuits would start if an organization formed earlier than another were to prohibit the use of these words by those parties formed subsequently.

In rejecting the complaint the court essentially adopted the latter view. In his reasoning Dr. Fuzessy said that usually the names of parties reflect the group of citizens the party intends to represent, as well as the philosophy of the party. Several parties may agree to represent a group of citizens, and several parties may represent a philosophy which may be designated by the use of the same term. In their full reading the names of the two parties involved in the suit cannot be confused, and therefore the defendant's use of the term does not violate the rights attached to the complainant's person.

#### **Opposition Parties Describe Foreign Policy Concepts**

*25000614 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
20 Jan 90 p 16*

[Excerpts from an article that appeared in the Hungarian periodical KULPOLITIKA No. 5, 1989, arranged by Attila Seres: "In Which Direction, Hungary? From the Parties' Political Workshops"]

[Text] Last spring it occurred to the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Institute that the foreign policy concepts of opposition parties should be publicized. The idea was realized by December, and the latest issue of the periodical KULPOLITIKA No. 5, 1989 published these views. The opposition parties' foreign policy concepts emerge clearly from these statements. In the following article we present two of the issues, and attempt to group the various views around those issues.

*Issue 1: How do you perceive the further development of Hungarian diplomacy, and how would you describe your party's foreign policy concept?*

#### **Dr. Rudolf Joo, Head of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] International Relations Committee:**

Hungarian foreign policy activities must be based on national interests, must be centered around the concept of Europe, and must respect the universal values and standards of human civilization. Our national interests are determined primarily by the individual peculiar features of our people's historical path, geographical situation, size, resources, and social and economic features, and the features of our language and culture. In defining Hungarian interest we start out from the nation concept that evolved historically in Central and Eastern Europe, one that does not limit nationality to citizenship. Anyone who professes to be Hungarian in Hungary, or dispersed beyond Hungary's borders, or in a minority status is a member of the Hungarian nation. In our judgement, Hungarian diplomacy must make greater efforts to achieve international recognition of the nationalities' need to pursue their individual and collective civil rights, to establish and to operate regional and institutional autonomous governments, and to maintain a direct relationship with their parent country. The grievances of national minorities must not become the internal affair of any one country, either on the basis of



human rights or on the basis of viewpoints of international security. These grievances do not even constitute bilateral issues, they are issues pertaining to the broadest national interest.

The placement of relations with the European Community upon qualitatively new levels is in Hungary's interest from both an economic and a political standpoint. This relationship is not just one of many: Within this relationship multilateral integrations with member countries and our bilateral relations are intertwined, mutually strengthening each other. One may say without exaggeration that the key issue of our return to Europe is our evolving cooperation with the EC.

**Dr. Sandor Karcsay, Foreign Affairs Spokesman for the Christian Democratic People's Party:**

My party's provisional foreign policy program, the "foreign policy of realities" starts out naturally from the foundations of our outlook on the world, from the basic principles of Christian morality. Christ's teaching of "I give you peace," a love of humanity that spans the entire world and applies to every nation, ensures the survival of the inhabitants of the earth, because only peace satisfies the requirements established by the sober mind. Accordingly, our country's foreign policy must endeavor to achieve that—a foreign policy that is determined by the nation's geopolitical situation.

Christian Democratic foreign policy regards the settlement of relations with our immediate neighbors in the spirit of friendship and cooperation as an issue of national existence. In recent times we frequently felt that our country was threatened by isolation, moreover, on occasion the threatening revival of the "Little Entente" emerged from the dim past. Since then, however, many things have changed, except for the geopolitical situation, which means primarily the presence of the Soviet world power. This reality manifests itself in the fact that along the borders of this region there is a super power which has inexhaustible natural resources, most of which have not been explored, one that disposes over a huge area and a large population, all of which ensure the future of a global power despite momentary economic difficulties and nationality problems. This state, regardless of what it will be called in the future, will always have weight and exert influence, and it will mean a market and economic opportunities to us. I cannot imagine a realistic Hungarian foreign policy not wanting to cooperate with this empire, while preserving the principles of independence and nonintervention.

**Dr. Anna Petrasovits, Social Democratic Party Chairwoman:**

The fundamental thesis of the Social Democratic foreign policy concept is that a qualitatively new system of relationships must be built between perestroika-Soviet Union and the new, democratic Hungarian Republic. Taking into consideration our nation's negative emotional attitude—which can be well understood and explained by historical events—toward Soviet troops

temporarily stationed in Hungary, and toward the forced importation of a system that is incapable of functioning, our relationship must be transformed in a manner consistent with the fundamental standards of international law. This can be accomplished by lengthy, tiresome, political and legal means. We cannot permit ourselves to enter into some political adventure whose slogan would be "Russians, go home!," because with that we would accomplish no more than endangering the Gorbachev line, making it more difficult for a policy whose existence is extremely important from the standpoint of solidifying the Hungarian democratization process to gain the upper hand. In the course of formulating our party's foreign relations we have learned that it is not in the West's interest to instantly change the European status quo, possibly as a result of violence. They are not encouraging us to unilaterally leave the Warsaw Pact, and therefore they will not support us in such an endeavor.

This should not mean in the least that we must surrender the ideal of a neutral, independent Hungary. But this may be only the end result of military policy and diplomatic work that is tolerant, which pays far reaching attention to mutual interests, and which requires multilateral conciliation. On the other hand, we will have to experience great disappointment if we act prematurely, because the West manifests a passive attitude in regard to this issue.

**Csaba Varga, Hungarian People's Party National Secretary:**

In the upcoming decades Hungarian foreign policy must endeavor to strengthen national independence, and must seek partners in the pursuit of such policies. Hungarian foreign policy must attempt to establish and develop all possible relationships in the interest of economic and social development. Starting out from our given features and internal situation, the economy must be helped more consciously than ever before. Replacing the establishment of relationships which have become traditional routines, a new type of far more active managerial role awaits our foreign policy, one that is consistent with the economic and social strategy developed by the new parliament and agreed to by the new coalition government.

Neutrality may be an attractive watchword and an attractive party program. On the other hand, pure neutrality exists nowhere in the world. Every society, each and every policy, are committed to pursue one or another direction in the background of an announced neutrality. In considering Hungarian neutrality our starting point must be that our country is in the bumper zone of two global systems, and neither global power would permit, support, or encourage neutrality with respect to Hungarian foreign policy. I suspect that not only the Soviet Union would protest, but the FRG would disagree in the same way, and for that matter the American leadership would do the same.

**Andras B. Vagvolgyi, Member of the Association of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] Political Advisory Body:**

First of all, I would like to stress that FIDESZ disagrees with viewpoints capable of perceiving discontinuation of our Warsaw Pact membership only by way of the simultaneous dissolution of military blocs. Our movement supports the earliest possible realization of the country's neutrality. In this relation it is the most important task of Hungarian foreign policy to immediately begin negotiations with Warsaw Pact member states, primarily with the Soviet Union, concerning the consummation of bilateral nonaggression, friendship, and cooperative agreements. The Soviet Union and our neighbors must be given assurances that they cannot be attacked or violently threatened by Hungary. Starting from the principles of national self-determination and the protection of minorities, any prevailing Hungarian government must take advantage of all political means to protect Hungarian minorities that were left outside of our borders. In given cases, one must take forceful positions in regard to the distortion of minority rights, by taking advantage of publicity offered by various international forums. In the framework of a broader all-European and a Central European settlement, we must take an initiative to convene an international conference for the protection of minorities.

FIDESZ rejects internationalism, which, as the expansionary ideology of the modern age Russian empire, inflicted immense damage in relationships among East-Central European nations. Our movement finds it necessary to distinguish between peoples residing in various states on the one hand, and their relations with the governments that have been ordered to govern them on the other, and we feel that this is particularly important in the case of organized dictatorships. In departing from past practice which for long has confused the friendship between nations with the friendship of dictatorial elites which have been imposed over these nations, this differentiation must be accomplished by future Hungarian governments.

**Tamas Zala, of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]:**

The SZDSZ is aware of the kind of responsibility it assumes when it takes a position on Hungarian foreign affairs. But we do accept this responsibility, even though thus far we have had no opportunity to involve ourselves in foreign affairs. Unfortunately, at the moment we do not know what exact obligations Hungary has as a result of treaties and agreements in force, supposedly existing additional clauses and verbal promises made through informal channels in the course of frequent contacts. The sober mind and the elementary interests of the nation dictate that no new commitments be made by the government, by any of its organs or ministries, or by the ruling party which enjoys hegemony at present, until the free elections. It will be the task of a coalition cabinet to be formed after the elections to thoroughly review the

agreements without delay, and to determine which matters we agreed to voluntarily, and which ones on the basis of external pressure, and to examine what the things are that serve the nation's interests, and how we can relieve ourselves of commitments that are disadvantageous from our standpoint. In the same way, the initiation of a new orientation in foreign affairs also awaits the new coalition government.

*Issue 2: Should the future Hungarian foreign policy orient itself toward the East or the West?*

**Rudolf Joo:**

It would be desirable to sustain the idea that the building of relations in one direction is not necessarily accompanied by a mechanical decline of relations in the other. The exceptions to this rule would be the earlier ideology guided and other coerced cooperative forms which were disadvantageous insofar as our economic interests were concerned (e.g. within CEMA), or which retarded the democratic process in Hungary.

It appears that the Soviet leadership is fundamentally reassessing both its foreign policy and its military strategy. There are signs which indicate that at the present level of weapons development and with changes in defensive doctrines the significance of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary is decreasing. In the new situation the role of the Warsaw Pact also depreciates from Moscow's standpoint. In my view, a full removal of the Soviet military from Hungary would not have a "static" impact on European power conditions as they have evolved. This fact should be stressed by Hungary in its diplomatic efforts as a matter of an initiative, pointing out that the process of reduced troop levels in Hungary could slow down or render superfluous the planned redeployment of American F-16 fighter airplanes from Spain to Italy.

But the independence of Hungarian foreign policy may also be increased along with the recognition of the Warsaw Pact as a matter of political reality, if (a) the military organizations become more open to the outside world and do not, in any respect, hinder the evolution of linkages of member countries in other directions; if (b) relationships between member countries are built on confidence and on interest reconciliation based on equal rights, and they rule out in principle as well as in practice the application of force, as well as dependence and the feeling of being threatened that flow from this; and if (c) Hungary, for example, could remain a member of the Warsaw Pact political organization, while in the meantime reducing its military role, or completely discontinuing that role.

**Dr. Sandor Karcsay:**

We are tied to the East by economic interests and by an existing military-economic alliance, while we are linked to the West by our culture, our spirit, and the bonds of our 1,000-year history. Our historic role has been to build a bridge between the two social systems. We must

avoid any conduct which results in political or economic destabilization, and thus in reduced confidence between the two world powers. Our collateral for a return to Europe rests with the dynamic development of economic and cultural relations which tie us to West European countries, and we must use every opportunity to achieve that dynamic development. My party's program does not include a statement concerning neutrality and the future of the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, there is a valuable program statement which holds that "we pledge solidarity to, and support, East European countries which, like Hungary, struggle to regain their independence and national existence. Our common past, our economic and cultural interdependence, and an identical economic situation tie us to a greater part of our neighbors.

**Dr. Anna Petrasovits:**

In the next decade, the idea of building a political and economic unit which is initially loose and later becomes tighter appears to be a self-evident alternative to Central European nations squeezed between the Soviet Union and a unifying Europe. An alliance formation of small Central and East European nations based on equality may make the return to Europe easier for these nations.

The foreign policy of the Anglo-Saxon world, and within that the foreign policy of the United States, has suggested in recent times that Central Europe has appreciated by a shade of a degree. We believe that official Hungary senses this change, and is taking advantage of this change as much as possible. Without fostering illusions, we, the Social Democrats belonging to the opposition, recognize some unexplored opportunities in the Anglo-Saxon, and particularly in the American, relationship. In the course of its foreign affairs activities, the Social Democratic Party felt that it is perhaps the United States and the Anglo-Saxon countries which assign the highest value to our efforts to establish a market economy and a democratic institutional system. And these are precisely the endeavors which represent the first real steps toward Europe. It would be an odd paradox, but one which undoubtedly has some realistic connotations, if the return path to Europe would lead us through America and an Anglo-Saxon orientation.

**Csaba Varga:**

I am convinced that in its present geostrategic and political situation Hungary cannot leave the Warsaw Pact, not even if multiparty conditions exist. At most it may accelerate the process, or make it more radical. Our endeavors must concentrate on the matter of how the Warsaw Pact could be reformed as a military and political alliance system. I feel that most recent Hungarian foreign policy manifestations are on the right track. We must continue to accept the principle that our Warsaw Pact membership must not mean the right to interfere in the internal affairs of any other country.

As far as specific, practical steps are concerned, it would be important not to restrict our international relations to the state level, but to take advantage of the opportunity

provided by the multiparty system to build much richer relationships. This would be done in the interest of achieving a noncommitted status or relative neutrality. In this regard Hungarian foreign policy must become much more active, helping the development of party relations at every level.

**Andras B. Vagvolgyi:**

From the standpoint of our foreign policy orientation, our primary goal is to regain a level of sovereignty which enables us to hold an equal membership in the community of European nations, within a world that is based on multiple dependencies. This is to be accomplished once we have freed ourselves from our situation of dependence vis-a-vis Russian imperialistic policies.

After closing the chapter of our last 43 years of several centuries of dependence on various European and non-European great powers, we do not wish to become a part of any power's sphere of interest, but instead intend to support a process which exchanges the present bipolar division of world power for a multicentered system in which small nations are assured of playing a greater and more independent role. In this process the natural point to which we are attracted is Western Europe, which is in the process of becoming unified. In this spirit we must reexamine our relationship with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Without delay we must begin negotiations for the removal of Soviet troops from Hungary in the shortest time possible. If the Soviet Union wishes to station defensive forces in Hungary until such time that the country becomes neutral, it may do so only on the basis of a new, bilateral agreement approved by a freely elected parliament, and on the basis of paying a standard fee pursuant to international practice. The maximum conceivable goal would be our leaving the Warsaw Pact and the declaration of Hungary's neutrality. The minimum goal would be the transformation of the Warsaw Pact into a new alliance based on a new treaty, which is truly defensive in character and ensures the equality and sovereignty of member countries. The ultimate decision in this regard will be made in the form of a popular vote.

**Tamas Zala:**

Two important factors must not be disregarded in pondering Hungary's foreign policy orientation. On the one hand we are struggling as captives of a paradox, and on the other we are being tempted by illusions. Hungary is a member of the Warsaw Pact and is part of CEMA. The leading circles in the Communist Party which still governs on its own continually stress the fact that this linkage is not only a given feature, but is also an alliance which was agreed to voluntarily and one that is useful, and it should be invented if it did not exist. They say that without the Warsaw Pact we would be the punching ball of the world and our independence would be endangered, and without CEMA our economic future would have no perspective. The SZDSZ does not at all share this view. Historical analysis and an evaluation of our opportunities suggest to us that our linkage to the present

system of alliances in itself is similar to the millstone tied to the neck of a drowning man, even if one disregards the heavy, specific commitments. That is, there is an alternative to this foreign policy, and it is possible to even draw a sketch of this alternative. Above all, the issue pertains to a change in orientation. The one-sided orientation must be exchanged for a two-sided orientation, but the other orientation which has been neglected for decades must be emphasized. In its program for changing the system the SZDSZ says: "In our view, moving the country as close as possible to the developed Western world is the chief task of Hungarian foreign policy."

### Opposition Parties Discuss Foreign Policy Views

25000657B Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in  
Hungarian 10 Feb 90 pp 4-6

[Interview with Peter Hardi, director of the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Institute [MKI], and opposition party foreign policy experts Andras Gergely of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], Miklos Haraszti of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], Vilmos Heiszler of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary [MSZDP], and Levente Ravasz, of the Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Citizens' Party [FKgP]: "Conversation About Future Foreign Policy: The Robbing of Eastern Europe"; date and place not given]

[Text] What chances are there for a rearrangement of Europe 45 years after the Yalta "settlement," and what role can Hungarian foreign policy play in this rearrangement after the upcoming elections? This was the topic we discussed with MKI Director Peter Hardi, and with opposition party experts Andras Gergely of the MDF, Miklos Haraszti of the SZDSZ, Vilmos Heiszler of the MSZDP, and Levente Ravasz of the FKgP.

[HVG] What will the government that is to be established after the March elections inherit in terms of foreign policy?

[Hardi] In recent times Hungarian foreign policy has manifested endeavors that would have been inconceivable in the absence of the present democratic transformation process. Although Hungarian foreign policy is not based on a coalition, the pressure exerted jointly by the opposition parties on the present government can be felt in several areas. The other force influencing official Hungarian foreign policy has been the visible change in Soviet foreign policy beginning in 1985, and the virtually explosive rearrangement of the East European region last year. As a result of all this, the present Hungarian foreign policy line is fundamentally different from what it was two years, or even one year ago. This is true even if official foreign policy likes to stress continuity. A specific example of the radically changed Hungarian foreign policy direction is the position taken recently on the removal of Soviet troops. This is an obvious example of a change that took place in response to pressure exercised by Eastern bloc countries, and by the opposition. If

the new Czechoslovak leadership under Vaclav Havel did not take such a firm stance to start negotiations regarding Soviet troop removal, it is likely that the Hungarian position would not have become as radical as it has since November.

[HVG] You regard as radical the change in official Hungarian foreign policy regarding Soviet troop removal. An FKgP leader went further in a recent speech: He demanded the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops.

[Ravasz] This took place because we believe that a situation in which the Soviet Union dictates cannot be sustained in our system of relationships. Certainly one could find governmental means to accelerate the process of Soviet troop withdrawals. I am convinced that it is also in the interest of the Soviet Union to maintain the commercial and cultural relations that have evolved in the past decades, as well as to see to it that the Hungarian change in regimes does not become an obstacle to bilateral relations.

[Gergely] The demand made by Mr. Torgyan, the FKgP representative, is more than radical. It would be more appropriate to say that it was one-sided, in that Mr. Torgyan would not make troop withdrawal contingent on negotiations.

[Hardi] As far as technical implementation is concerned, one of the possibilities would be for the two sides to sit down and negotiate and develop a detailed schedule for the removal of troops—the closure of barracks, the vacating of residential areas, and the transfer of storage houses and other buildings. One could, of course, call on the Soviet Union to leave instantly, and the schedule would be the same if they accept that request. In the course of an election campaign such statements tend to provide domestic political advantages in my view, but they will not remove Soviet troops from Hungary earlier.

[HVG] Is this really only a technical issue? Would the position of the two sides fully coincide in regard to other aspects of troop withdrawal?

[Haraszti] Mr. Torgyan is pounding on open gates. In reality, he described the actual situation, and did not express demands. The Soviet Union is in no position not to remove its troops from Hungary. At this time it cannot permit itself to think in terms of maintaining, in any way, Stalin's Central European empire.

[Ravasz] Hungarian foreign policy must finally free itself from the girlish shyness which still manifests itself in the course of negotiations with the Soviet Union. One must recognize that Hungary is independent and stands on its own feet only if it is capable of representing its own interests. Soviet troop removal is a primary issue in this regard, because troop removal guarantees that democracy will evolve without the shadow cast by armed power.

[Gergely] I want to make it clear that we will call the free elections 'free elections' even if the Soviet troops stay here until then. I believe that our views do not differ on whether the Soviet troops should be removed, but they differ on the method of withdrawal, on what should be the policy thereafter, because we must also think about the subsequent steps.

[HVG] And what may follow in Hungarian foreign policy after the Soviet troop removal? What line will postelection official Hungarian foreign policy follow? Can we expect some pronounced differences between the present foreign policy and the foreign policy after March?

[Gergely] The MDF also has some goals in the realm of foreign policy which may be distinguished from the present "official" foreign policy. We may define our perception as a policy which strives for a neutral status, and which encourages a unified Europe (and which concentrates on Europe). According to our original October 1989 program concept, Hungary's geopolitical situation (i.e. the fact that it does not abut a NATO country and that it is in a strategically insignificant area), the leading role it plays in transformation, and its relatively small size would make it possible to pursue separate paths in establishing a special status for itself, first within the Warsaw Pact, then by leaving the Warsaw Pact and joining the Western economic community. This was the image of a certain foreign policy which could have been used as the Hungarian path, but could not serve as a model. Quite naturally, the revolutions of late last year prompt us to rethink the way we want to implement our foreign policy. I would not say that we have a policy that is complete in every detail, but I can hardly believe that everyone is able to stay abreast of the events in Moscow, Washington, or even Vienna. In our view, the days of subregions, of Czech, Polish, Hungarian alliances have expired. They made sense during the past century, but not today. (I am not speaking here of good neighbor relations or about economic cooperation. I am talking about foreign policy and national security.) Such formations could not stand up against the Soviet, or even against "only" a Russian superior power, not to mention the fact that a unified Germany is on the horizon. In a situation like this we would have to stand on the side of one of the great powers, or a separate race would begin for the the mercy of one or another neighbor. I feel that an all-European settlement is of the essence, and within that we are primarily talking about German unity, of course. There is no reason to be concerned in this regard. It is apparent that the rearrangement of Europe, in which neither the United States nor England may stay away, must take place in the framework of a German peace treaty. Around such a peace treaty there may evolve a system of guarantees, even on the Helsinki foundations, which uniformly obligate every great power (and the smaller countries, of course) to preserve the European status quo. This would be the true negation of Yalta: Instead of a sharing by all powers, there would be an agreement by all powers not to share.

[HVG] All of this was recently stated by Gorbachev and Bush at Malta.

[Hardi] The earlier slogan, the one that was echoed repeatedly during the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] period was that the purpose of Hungarian foreign policy is to secure appropriate international conditions for the construction of socialism in Hungary. It would be impossible to say this today, because socialism as a goal has become totally meaningless. One cannot accurately determine what the present foreign policy line wants to convey. I believe that by now we cannot claim that the relationships between individual European countries and integrations could be conducted unchanged on the basis of the Helsinki system which governs the entire European coexistence, because the essence of Helsinki was to accept and to "manage" the East-West opposition. On the other hand, indications are that the East-West opposition is coming to an end, leaving behind a Soviet Union with its own military power and potential nuclear threat. This will continue to be a threat to Western Europe, even if the Warsaw Pact is dissolved. The way I see it, the Central East European region is beginning to belong nowhere, and the West is not at all prepared to take over this region. The question is whether this region is capable of organizing itself to somehow fill the power vacuum that evolves—for example, by way of a Polish-Czech-Hungarian axis as proposed by Havel—or if it is not capable of doing so, the way Andras Gergely [MDF] explained.

[Heisler] One of the torments of our region is that there has never been a power vacuum, meaning that beginning in the 16th century powers which did not belong here broke in all the time to the Central East European region and discontinued the autonomy of the individual states. The Russians did that to Poland, the Germans to the Czechs, and the Turks to the Hungarians. Accordingly, they always rendered the self-organizing efforts in the region impossible, and this was enhanced by their internal weaknesses. At present we are witnessing a rather interesting phenomenon: At the moment there happens to be no power which would want to break into this region, moreover, whatever power there is is preparing to remove itself. We must grab this opportunity if we want to free ourselves from constant external paternalism. The Havel proposal appears to be appropriate for this purpose. The fact that this idea came to the mind of a writer, and that by being freed from all political inhibitions he was first to dare to express this idea, just teases the professionals. As far as I am concerned, I regard this as one of the most important factors in the evolving political doctrines.

[Haraszti] We are thinking in terms of a united Europe. The institutional structure in which this appears is a problem to be resolved by political and military blocs, and by economic integration. As far as the political blocs are concerned, it appears certain that their disintegration will come about as a result of the Soviet bloc disintegration. In regard to the economic integration, one must say that the European Economic Community will fill the

vacuum, and this may be the seed of a new Europe. We regard the Polish-Czech-Hungarian cooperation mentioned before as important, so that our linking up with the European Economic Community does not take place in the midst of an overly sharp competitive war with the neighboring countries.

[HVG] The changes in the GDR had just barely begun when one could sense tension in Poland, France, and even in the Soviet Union in response to a possible unified Germany. The memories of the period before and during World War II are too close; the feeling of being threatened from two sides is not gone from our region.

[Gergely] From a practical standpoint we must base our considerations on a unified Germany and a Soviet Union, but even if we would have to consider only Russia, it would remain an impressive and strong power—a European great power even in its ruins. In my view, the above-mentioned regional organization in between two great powers is inconceivable; it is politically unrealistic. The region is also totally dependent from an economic standpoint. Its countries are poor in resources and are forced to engage in international cooperation. They would begin competing with each other. Considering their present economic structure they would be incapable of helping each other.

[Ravasz] Russia emerged in European politics when it was able to push its borders ahead by 500 km in the days of Napoleon. Then, when its borders were pushed back by 500 km after 1918, it was unable to play a serious role as a great power in the region until World War II. Thereafter it once again made some geopolitical advances, and it once again became a great power. Accordingly, one could guess what happens if this position of the Soviet Union ceases to exist as a new Eastern Europe evolves.

[Hardi] I also have the feeling that the Soviet Union will be squeezed to the peripheries of Europe, that it will cease to be one of the politically definitive powers in Europe, and that it will be able to affect the fate of Europe only in the form of a potential, massive military threat.

[Heiszler] It is unfortunate that the idea that German unity may mean a threat of war to Europe has deeply sunk into public consciousness. For this reason I should note at least that following the establishment of German unity in 1871 there followed one of the longest peaceful eras in Europe. Therefore, one could hardly state that German unity in and of itself means an instant threat of war. It is possible that the Soviet Union must surrender its imperial existence, but I will call the gentlemen's attention to the fact that Vladivostok is part of Russia, and that the shortest route from Europe to the strengthening Far Eastern regions leads through Russia. Also, one should not disregard the fact that it will be in the fundamental interest of a unified Europe to come about some time, to establish good relations with Russia. Thus,

I regard any kind of anti-Russian policies as damaging, the idea of destroying the Hungarian-Soviet or Hungarian-Russian relationship because of some just or unjust injuries suffered, or feelings of revenge. Even though this may produce a few votes in the first elections, it would be extremely damaging both in the short term and in the long run. I am more optimistic than my colleagues from the MDF with regard to economic cooperation among the Central East European countries. Western Europe did not experience splendid conditions around 1948-49, nevertheless it succeeded in establishing the foundations for European integration in areas close to each other. A Polish-Czech Silesia could play precisely the same role as the Ruhr or Saar regions and Lotharingia.

[Gergely] It seems as if the gentlemen are neglecting some international public security considerations, even though taken by itself the Ukraine, with its 40 million people, is a factor that cannot be disregarded. Just for this reason I would find an all-European settlement to be more appropriate. We must not forget about the role played by America in the regeneration and success of postwar Western Europe.

[Heiszler] It could hardly be our goal to expect America to remove itself from Europe, if we consider narrowly construed political interests. It may be idealistic to consider the establishment of a European community free of superpowers. It is even less significant to leave America out of Western Europe, because it obviously could take part in the economic reconstruction of Eastern Europe. And further, America is still separated from Western Europe by the Atlantic Ocean, while the Soviet Union is separated from Eastern Europe by the Carpathian Mountains at best, or not even by those.

[Haraszti] The transformation that began in Central Eastern Europe cannot be stopped. The future of Russia can be none other than democracy, even if it accomplishes that later than this region does. It is also possible that Russia will sink temporarily into the Pamiat adventure, but this will only accelerate the disintegration of the empire. We must redefine our earlier position concerning neutrality, because by emphasizing neutrality in the previous sense our purpose was to define our relationships with the Soviet Union. Today we are placing emphasis on true independence and autonomy, and on linkage with the Western integration on the basis of independence. Today the term neutrality means the absence of belonging to military blocs.

[Hardi] In earlier days, from a practical standpoint, Hungarian foreign policy was determined by the value system of Soviet global policies. The inertia of these policies is still present—let's just think of the Middle East, Africa, and the Vietnam region. There are still reflexes existing with regard to many things, for which the new government will have to reassign new values. The fact that today's foreign policy measures appear to be improvised does not necessarily mean that they were not thought through. All this means is that they do not yet fit into the still existing foreign policy formula.

**Government, Opposition Summit History Summarized***25000660G Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
7 Feb 90 p 4*

[Article by Andras Sereg: "History of Hungarian-Hungarian Summits"]

[Text] After two months of behind-the-scenes preparations, political conciliation talks began on 13 June last year in Parliament between the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP], the Opposition Roundtable [EKA], and seven social organizations. Participants at the "national triangle" agreed also to discuss economic issues at the conciliatory forum, in addition to political matters. Lively debate evolved at the discussions between the EKA and the third side concerning the latter's authority. This resulted in a walkout by the National Council of Trade Unions [SZOT] representative. Not infrequently, even those sitting on the same side argued: In regard to the timing of the elections for the president of the republic, for instance, the opposition proved to be divided to the end.

Three months later, on 18 September, before television cameras, 14 of the 16 organizations represented in the three sides signed a political agreement which projected the establishment of a Hungarian Republic based on a multiparty system. Two opposition parties—the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] and the Association of Young Democrats [FIDESZ]—decided at the last minute not to sign the documents. Their decision was supported by statements saying that in their judgment the agreements would make it possible to elect a president of the republic prior to free parliamentary elections, a situation which could provide a chance for the MSZMP to acquire a key position in power. The Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] attached a note to the agreement in which it declared that it finds it necessary to hold further negotiations concerning the discontinuation of the MSZMP's functioning at workplaces, the liquidation of the Workers Guard, and to have the state party provide a financial accounting. Although the Social Democratic Party of Hungary [MSZDP] signed the agreement, it noted its separate view in the minutes with regard to the election of the president. Thus, after the signing of the agreement the path for presenting the pivotal laws to Parliament was opened.

Following the establishment of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] in October, and after the November popular referendum, another three-day national summit took place in Parliament, beginning on 8 December. Seventeen parties and 13 social organizations took part in the closed-door Hungarian-Hungarian summit, and adopted a legislative package. Sharp debate evolved with regard to both the proposed budget and the housing concept. Moods had settled by the time the postsummit press conference took place: For example, the chairman

of the MDF announced that his organization does not want to resort to social demagoguery in the upcoming critical months.

**Communists Shed Reminders of Past in Election Campaign Rhetoric***25000606B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
23 Jan 90 p 5*

[Campaign advertisement by the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]]

[Text]

**Home Country and Progress—Progress and Security!**

"Truly wise patriots are only those persons who want to achieve something that is possible, aware of the fact that due to human frailty man cannot be either overly happy or unhappy without bounds, and therefore treads the middle of the road." (Istvan Szechenyi: Hítel)

Compatriots!

A new party is asking for your attention, confidence. We are speaking on behalf of the party, whose members consistently implemented the liquidation of the state party dictatorship. People are well aware of the fact that this could not have taken place without us. Having established conditions for a peaceful transition, the Socialist Party has permanently abandoned the Stalinist tradition. At this time we are turning to you, our compatriot, who feels a sense of responsibility for his family and his home country, irrespective of your outlook on the world, nationality, religion, or origins.

We request your support, as one who desires to have secure work opportunities, a decent living, and European living conditions in our country, and quite naturally, also for himself. We are seeking your attention, as one who wants peace and real progress, who wants individual prosperity and a community spirit, a decent environment and pure morals in this home country, that are appropriate for our sense of humaneness.

Pure morals are the support, the foundation stone of every country!

We are running in the parliamentary elections in order to represent our program which promises uplift and security. The Socialist Party wants to represent the nation!

For this reason we ask you to vote for the Socialist Party candidates!

Respected voter!

Today you are threatened not only by the forint's inflation and by the uncertainty of the future, but also by the inflation of promises and by the loss of the credibility of new words. You should believe those who have already proven with their deeds that they regard the nation's fate, the idea of a community and solidarity, as more



important than power, and that they appreciate the efforts of previous generations to build the country.

Socialists had the strength to implement a deep-rooted political turnaround. It should serve as a warning, however, that one can hear an increasing number of distorted, alarmist voices in the course of democratic transformation. Demands are on the increase for the denial of not only the lies of the past, but also the values of the past, for the humiliation of the faith and self-respect of hundreds of thousands, and for the proclamation of reckoning. Not even this confusion of sounds which irritates the ear must make us forget that the people cannot be dismissed.

We want settlement of accounts, not reckoning!

What does the Socialist Party represent?

It fights for the construction of a homeland in which the requirements for individual rights to freedom, social justice, and national cooperation are productively related; where the city is not the enemy of the village and the village is not the enemy of the city. It is laboring for a healthy and cultured Hungary in which an efficient market economy and social security, as well as entrepreneurial competition and social solidarity, are balanced, and where there is room for individual initiative and for autonomous governance. A country where leadership is in the hands of those fit to lead, and where decision-making is in the hands of the people.

The community of autonomous citizens who establish autonomous governance and sovereign legislation are the repositories of democracy.

The Socialist Party protects the family, the village, and the city, the nation, and the anxiously guarded values of the past and the present. It takes part in the full implementation of a social turnaround in the interest of a more secure future.

It is opposed to the idea that a new enslavement to money and indebtedness, and unbearable inequalities, take the place of the rule of a single-party and state bureaucracy. It represents the interests of decently working and enterprising people, families, and communities. It demands that every honest Hungarian should be able to fulfill his expectations in this country.

Our watchword: home country and progress—progress and security!

What does the Socialist Party want?

A well functioning economy based on mixed ownership! A secure livelihood for workers! The avoidance of mass unemployment! Success for entrepreneurs! Modern schools for the homeland, and the prevailing of talent! A home fit for human beings for everyone! Professional administration, offices without corruption! A free press, authentic information, decent publicity! Public security, the protection of public order!

The Socialist Party rejects:

An economic policy that increases poverty! Discrimination based on race, political, or religious beliefs! Anti-democratic manifestations which urge reckoning, and utterings which cause fright and raise fear! The rule of the minority over the majority! All forms of dictatorship! As socialists, we have learned our lessons from the past after painful experiences. We know that the country is facing difficult years, and that the time for empty promises has expired.

If you want your family to prosper, and if you want to see uplift and security for the country...

Vote for the Socialist Party!

### **Election Code of Ethics To Be Published**

*25000606A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
23 Jan 90 pp 1, 5*

[Interview with Imre Konya, spokesman for the Independent Lawyers' Forum, on 22 January, by Lajos Bodnar: "Election Ethics and Political Dignity"; place of interview not given; first two paragraphs are NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] In the course of an earlier debate concerning the process of electing a president of the republic, Imre Konya, a representative of the Independent Lawyer's Forum, mentioned the threat of "an American style election campaign."

Although the presidential elections were postponed, the campaign became polarized, and to a large extent acquired the characteristics of American-style elections. We conversed with Konya yesterday, in the final phase of preparing a needed ethical code for elections.

[NEPSZABADSAG] In a few minutes political parties will convene at the criminal law department of the Lorand Eotvos University of Science law school to approve an ethical code for elections. What purpose could a collection of rules of ethics serve in the final part of a power struggle fueled by Duna-Gate?

[Konya] I would like to mention at the outset that under no circumstances could the wiretapping scandal be controlled by way of a code of ethics. And I believe that wiretapping would not be a part of American-style elections either. Watergate was an extraordinary case in America, so much so that the president was removed as a result. It is obviously something different we intend to resolve with the code of ethics. It is not as if we would want to avoid an American-style election campaign from the outset. And particularly not if what is understood by an "American-style election campaign" is a tough struggle among opponents, one that is not devoid of external manifestations. Our purpose is to serve the purity of elections. In this context, we would like people to understand that at present, in the course of the March elections, they may be part of a historically unique



decision. We have been waiting for about a year for the political system to transform, so that we have a legitimate Parliament and a legitimate government at last.

[NEPSZABADSAG] We read in the Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] proclamation published Saturday that peaceful transition has been endangered. Do you personally feel that there is a danger like that?

[Konya] I continue to believe that peaceful transition is not being threatened. I regard this statement as more of a scare technique. Precisely for this reason, our purpose with the ethical code is not to blunt the political struggle. I envision the threat more in terms of a further continuation of the transition, of a situation in which no real turnaround takes place. A real turnaround will take place only if the elections produce a new power with an undisputed legitimacy. And this may be expected to occur only if people cast their votes.

[NEPSZABADSAG] In earlier days politics were referred to as the "gentleman's mischief." Today's politics, on the other hand, are recognized as mischief perpetrated by the parties.

[Konya] I find it very important that the press, that is mass communications, not strengthen the lack of confidence in parties. We must recognize that in a democracy politics manifests itself primarily in the framework of parties. Accordingly, parliamentary representation should not be accomplished primarily by way of independent candidates. Instead the candidates of parties should be seated in Parliament, in such a manner that citizens can clearly see what political trend they represent.

[NEPSZABADSAG] As the initiator of roundtable negotiations don't you feel a certain sense of responsibility for the fact that while political forces negotiate in Hungary, the express train of the East European revolution has passed us by?

[Konya] I firmly disagree with the idea that East European states have come out ahead of us as a result of changes that occurred at lightning speed. Because in those states the processes were appropriate, but were not, by far, as penetrating as they are in Hungary. Indeed, negotiations were prolonged in Hungary, but many things were accomplished in the course of prolonged negotiations which were not accomplished elsewhere. On the other hand, the fact that we are not ahead in transforming society hinged upon the former Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP]. It took a very long time before the battles inside the MSZMP were decided, and reform forces gained the upper hand.

[NEPSZABADSAG] For a long time the president of the republic was mentioned as the key figure in bringing about peaceful transition. Is not a power factor elected by the people missing from the political palette today?

[Konya] The election of a president of the republic would not have been a solution. It could have been a

balancing force, of course, if the country had a political personality like Vaclav Havel, who clearly enjoys the confidence of society as a whole. Under our circumstances a premature presidential election would have polarized the situation even more, and would not have produced lasting results. The role of the ethical code is significant, because as a result of that code the election campaign may be conducted at a dignified level, and the political struggle for mandates may be fought in an appropriate framework, with the exclusion of ignoble means.

### Prosecutor Manifests Tolerance Regarding Racist Statements

25000660F Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
7 Feb 90 p 4

[Interview with Dr. Sandor Nyiri, deputy supreme state prosecutor, concerning an article published in 168 ORA under the rubric "Others Said It," by Zsolt Bocskay: "What Does the Hungarian Doctrine Incite People To Do?"; date and place not given]

[Text] The latest issue of the weekly 168 ORA gives this title to an interview with several people, conducted by Zsolt Bocskay, about an article entitled "The Hungarian Doctrine," that was published in MAGYAR HOLNAP. This article regarded "the Jewry, Gypsies, Germanics, Slavs and Olahs [offensive designation for Romanians] who live in blocs" [as published] as "races not able to assimilate at all, or capable of assimilating to a lesser extent," and which "dominate Hungarian life." The following is an excerpt from the dialogue with Deputy Supreme State Prosecutor Dr. Sandor Nyiri conducted by the reporter. Thereafter we quote from the remarks made by editor in chief Akos Mester.

[NEPSZABADSAG] You quoted from the constitution and cited a section of the press law. Hearing these it occurred to me: It is clear that the article violated these provisions. But did it indeed violate these provisions? Where is the borderline where transgression constitutes a violation of these provisions? The time has come to discuss these issues.

[Nyiri] You are seeking a response to this question from the jurist, from the prosecutor. I would like to give you my private view, which holds that the Hungarian history of the past decades has provided a great number of examples of the kinds of tragedies that result from concluding political debate in the criminal courtroom. I am able to contrast, to qualify this action in my capacity as a jurist, but I would not find it advantageous to utilize the means provided by criminal law in the very first period of democratization. Doing so could set back the positive social process, which for the time being exists only in an embryonic form in this homeland.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Should I understand this to mean that lately you have been confronted with cases like this on a daily basis, and that you do not initiate proceedings

even though you could, according to the legal provisions, because you feel that one should wait?

[Nyiri] By way of a dogmatic interpretation of law, I can come to the point of establishing that a criminal act has been committed. But the criteria for a crime also include the element of the threat the crime presents to society. And a separate debate could be started on the issue of what kind of threat an article or a statement written or made in haste, or prompted by strong passions, carries at this point. This is one reason why we take the position that at this point we must not utilize the means made available by criminal law to harness these phenomena, but that instead the need calls for appropriate reserve arguments, arguments based on science and history, to respond to these matters, rather than to remain on the surface and play ball with statements that sound good.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Could it be predicted today, in February 1990, how long the prosecutor's office will manifest such patience and tolerance?

[Nyiri] I do not engage in making forecasts. We observe the phenomena that appear in society, and when these phenomena reach the stage that they present a threat to society, at which time we must use the means provided by law, we will do so, and we must do so.

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We had hoped that by now determining whether an act is or is not contrary to law would no longer be a matter of political assessment. We felt that by now we would be able to permanently depart from the practice of political considerations governing the matters over which the prosecutor's office may close its eyes, and what it will act upon, what it is it tolerates, and what those things are that it will strike down—how do we say this?—"with the full force of the law...." The incitement and discrimination that appeared in the newspaper do not simply offend journalistic ethics: Minimizing things to this extent could draw dangerous consequences, according to a comment by Akos Mester, which was added to the interview.

#### **Jewish Writer Regards Anti-Semitism Charges as Exaggerated**

90A10192A Budapest SZOMBAT in Hungarian  
Jan 90 p 4

[Article by Janos Pelle: "The Collection of Stigmas"]

[Text] If there was any doubt thus far, it has become apparent by now that there is a need for our periodical, and, however modest it is, for a publication to represent the identity of the Jewish intelligentsia and to offer itself as a partner in a dialogue in which the concerned side never spoke....

Once again I read Sandor Csoori's response to Imre Mecs' open letter; the outstanding poet's article, which could be appropriately regarded as an essay, appeared in

the 24 November 1988 issue of MAGYAR NEMZET. I feel compelled to express my view, in specific terms about the "anti-Semitism charge," the stigma mentioned by Csoori, which in his view was cast upon populist writers and Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] leaders first by the Communists, and lately by the Free Democrats [Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)]. Csoori passionately defends himself against the insinuation, and he certainly has the right to do so. He regards it as just as much of an offensive, rough-and-ready slander as if "someone were to constantly spread the word that the SZDSZ is the party of the Budapest intelligentsia of Jewish origin."

Curiously, 20th-century Hungarian history is rich in stigmas and exclusionary adjectives. Let us assume, for example, that a gentry blinded by his social status were to verbally insult a person by calling him a "peasant." (I am emphasizing that the insult was made verbally, because no sane person would ever print the word "peasant" as a pejorative adjective.) But what else could a person add to this word once he had uttered this foolish insult? Could he add, for example, "you Hungarian, Calvinist peasant!"? In contrast, there has always been a broad opportunity to expand the term "Jew" when used as a degrading adjective, by adding more stigmas. One could be a "vagabond Jewish Communist," or a "member of the cosmopolitan Jewish intelligentsia." At the same time, these combinations of qualifying adjectives also revealed, more or less, who was using these terms on what occasion. An awakening Hungarian with high expectations but a low level of culture, who was filled with political ambition, or later, a member of the Arrow Cross Party, could have said such a thing during the first half of the century. One should note, however, that no honorable Christian member of the Hungarian intelligentsia ever lowered himself to pile up such an insult.

Fortunately, these are different times. Nevertheless, it is not reassuring to know that according to Sandor Csoori, one of the MDF leaders, a new stigma has become fashionable nowadays: anti-Semite, one who hates Jews. In this relation one should first clarify who is handing out these stigmas; then we should find out whether there is a basis for it, or if it is just one of those quick insults like someone shouting at his neighbor: "you leper!"

According to some MDF leaders, calling the MDF anti-Semitic is a diabolical tactical step taken by the SZDSZ. It would be beneficial to catch a leader or prominent personality from the Free Democrats in the act of voicing his suspicion that MDF leaders or followers hate Jews. To the best of my knowledge, however, one cannot find such an SZDSZ leader even in a museum, just as the members of the MDF steering committee are not foolish enough to violate the constitution which strictly prohibits all kinds of racial or religious incitement.

Debating partners within Hungary should not be handing out such stigmas, or complaining about them. Nevertheless, it is worth saying this much about the

absurd charge of anti-Semitism: It truly attempts to place an equation mark between the hatred of Jews in the 1940's, which ended up in genocide, and damages caused by "oversized Jewish sensitivity."

It is yet another matter that the foreign press cannot be told how to react to this subject, if, for example, speaking of the popular referendum in which Western newspapers judged some of the MDF's slogans calling for boycott as nationalistic and as having an anti-Semitic flavor, this is not something for which the "cosmopolitan Jewish propaganda machinery" can be blamed. And, if someone is still of the opinion that he is better off if he does not make such statements in public unless he wants to be stigmatized as an anti-Semite... You see how diabolical this circle is?

This is also the time for populist writers and MDF leaders to stop fighting demons, and if by any chance, they notice that they have had stigmas cast upon themselves, they should not blame others.

## POLAND

### 'Movement for Polish Politics' Calls for Center-Right Forum

90EP0315A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish  
5 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by (jk): "Center-Right Roundtable"]

[Text] "The Movement for Polish Politics is coming out with an initiative calling for the convention of a Forum of the Polish Center-Right. With this initiative, we want to call attention to various independent groupings in Poland: liberal, conservative, Christian, and national ones. We would like to enable these parties and groups, which do not raise the slogans of socialism on their standards in any form, to meet. At the same time, I point out that in the case of this meeting we do not have in mind any kind of consolidation, because we know that for the time being that is impossible to carry out. However, we are eager to exchange views and define those elements that unite the various groups and do not cause division," Tomasz Wolek, the plenipotentiary of the Movement for Polish Politics, told ZYCIE WARSZAWY yesterday, 4 January, before the start of its conference. Two other of the movement's initiators, Michal Wojtczak (deputy minister of agriculture) and Kazimierz Michal Ujazdowski, also answered reporters' questions.

The Movement for Polish Democracy arose on the initiative of, among others, some deputies of the OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club], activists of the Citizens Committees, economic and industrial societies, and political groups. The movement's representatives resolutely emphasized that it does not constitute a party of any sort or even a group that has clearly specified political and economic views. It understands its role as working on a synthesis and bringing various groups of

the Polish center-right closer together. It appeals to Christian ideals and draws values from the ethos of emancipatory liberalism as well as conservatism understood as a certain type of sensitivity and relation to tradition.

In the course of the conference, Michal Wojtczak said, "We propose that the Forum of the Polish Center-Right take place on 3-4 March in Poznan. We understand it as a roundtable specific to this group, but we are not at heart its organizers, but rather the side that made it accessible."

The representatives of the Movement for Polish Politics have already managed to conduct talks with, among others, the Christian National Union regarding the participation of some parties and groups in the Poznan meeting.

## ROMANIA

### Romanian Princesses Margarita, Sophia Visit Romania

90EB0222A Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 22 Jan 90 p 6

[Article by Bo Draebel and Steen Jacobsen: "Two Princesses in Romania"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] Princesses Margarita and Sophia feel that they have finally come home, and not that they have come to reinstate the monarchy.

"My goodness, how can you ask me about something so inconsequential? The issue here is helping the Romanian people, who have undergone unimaginable suffering, not whether my father will get his castle or other properties back."

Forty-year-old Princess Margarita, King Michael's eldest daughter, is the very image of her Danish mother, Queen Anne, and she has the gift of gab as well.

This is what a French journalist discovered when he asked whether the reason for her visit to Romania was because the royal family had hopes of regaining their property following the political upheaval.

The two unmarried Romanian princesses, Margarita and Sophia, who is 32, have turned up in Bucharest accompanied by two Romanian friends and a pair of advisors. Yesterday the princesses held a press conference in a hotel suite, surrounded by bouquets of flowers and with real light bulbs in the chandeliers, which are a rare commodity here.

Princess Margarita, who was wearing a short, modestly decorated dress, welcomed a crowd of 100 Romanian and foreign press representatives with the following words: "I want to thank you for what the press has done

for Romanian freedom, and for the support the people have received as a result of your having wakened the conscience of the world."

#### Nonpolitical Meeting

"Our visit is absolutely and categorically nonpolitical," maintained Princess Margarita. "We have come as Romanians, not to reinstate the monarchy. The most important issue now is for Romanians to be able to express their wishes."

"With this visit, my sister and I wish to find ourselves and our roots in the land from which we have been cut off since birth," said Princess Margarita.

"When we return home to Geneva, where our father lives, we will report to him as to whether, in the long term, we can help Romania and do our part in the development of the country."

Speaking about herself, Princess Margarita says that she is a sociologist by profession. "I have worked for the UN, among other organizations. But six months ago I quit and returned home to help my parents set up an office. We found this to be necessary in light of the developments taking place in Romania, which my parents had followed closely the entire time."

Princess Sophia explains that she is trained as a nurse. "I am also an artist, and have had an number of exhibitions. I am presently studying in the United States."

King Michael and Queen Anne have three more daughters. Princess Helena, who is married and lives in England, Princess Irina, who is married to a Swede and lives on a ranch in Oregon, and the youngest, Princess Maria. She is a nurse at a pediatric hospital in the United States.

#### First Time in Romania

"This is the first time I have been in Romania, and I think that the day I arrived was the greatest experience of my life," said Princess Margarita.

She and her sister were welcomed at the airport with a red carpet and flowers, as is the custom with royal receptions.

"To see my country, and feel the warmth with which we were received—I'll never forget it," adds Princess Sophia. "Oh, I feel like I'm finally home."

The two princesses have not spoken with the country's new politicians, and they point out that they do not involve themselves in politics. "We have been to hospitals and seen the lack of even the simplest instruments," says Princess Margarita.

"We have visited old age homes where the patients sat and froze. We have seen children's homes filled with abandoned children, because the government forced people to have more children than they could afford, and we cried when we saw all of these unwanted children, who will never know a mother's love."

Princess Margarita has no comment regarding the fact that the western countries accepted Nicolae Ceausescu. "Just to see pictures of a man who destroyed his own country, that was awful enough."

Nor does she have any dreams that the Romanian throne will be hers. In the time of the monarchy, the royal succession in Romania was patrilineal.

"On the other hand, I wish with all my heart to be able to live in Romania," says Princess Margarita, "for I am a Romanian."

This pronouncement caused the Romanian press people to stand up and applaud. One journalist asked whether the princesses would see to it that a picture of the entire Romanian royal family was sent to Bucharest, so that the newspapers could publish it.

"My father has good memories of King Michael, and we will be glad to see him soon," said the Romanian journalist.

"My father is both a believer in democracy and a patriot," says Princess Margarita. "His only desire is to come home. He has dreamed about it for 42 years."

## POLAND

**Optimistic Forecast of Economic Cooperation With Japanese**

90EP0347A Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish No 7, 16 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Andrzej Kalicki: "Opportunity for Polish-Japanese Cooperation"]

[Text] Premier Toshiki Kaifu's visit to Warsaw is thought to have created a very necessary incentive and a new climate for the development of economic relations between Poland and Japan. What seems particularly important from the standpoint of our import capacity is the restoration of our access to Export-Import Bank credit (500 million zlotys over 3 years) along with the renewal of government credit guarantees for Japanese exports that sell to our country (350 million dollars over 2 years).

Our exports to the Japanese market can benefit in turn from the promise to include Poland as of 1 April of this year on the list of countries enjoying what is called the general preferential system, which in practical terms means lower tariffs or their elimination altogether for certain commodities we export.

When we analyze the data portraying Poland's trade with Japan until now, we find no reason to be particularly satisfied. This trade was of no more than marginal significance to Japan, which simultaneously placed no higher than 13th on the list of Poland's free market partners. We should also add that during the 1980's Japan ceased to act in the capacity in which it had functioned to a certain extent the decade before, that of technology provider.

During the 1980's we never managed to achieve the total trade turnovers with Japan that had been characteristic of the latter half of the 1970's, owing to the severe restrictions we placed on imports. The value of our exports, on the other hand, already long ago exceeded the previous record, reaching 150 million dollars in 1988. According to data from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation, this figure increased by about 10 percent last year, but our Japanese imports declined by 15-20 percent. This meant a near balance, for the first time in the history of Polish-Japanese trade.

The structure of our exports to Japan has not changed for several years. After the decline in hard coal sales at the beginning of the decade, fish products became our primary export, especially squid, particularly favored by the

Japanese. Further down the list are powdered milk and casein, down, potato flour, distilled spirits, and chemicals. Construction and installation services related to carrying out the Dromex-Marubena contract in Iraq accounted for a major share of 1988 income and were decisive in the fact that this income doubled.

Trade itself is still not a determining factor in economic cooperation, but there have recently also been other areas that have given us no cause to be especially proud. There are nearly 1,000 joint ventures presently operating in our country, but no companies have Japanese capital. Until now Japanese firms have not considered our country an interesting place for investment.

Therefore the signing of an agreement to protect mutual investments has been on the list of institutional measures we have been proposing to the Japanese for years to build up the infrastructure of relations between our two countries. Another matter that has interested us for a long time now, unfortunately so far without result, is the signing of an airline agreement giving our national carrier the right to regular flights to Tokyo.

During the talks between the two government delegations in Warsaw, we presented to the Japanese a note with a list of measures we consider to be most important. Among them are a proposal to create a Polish-Japanese investment bank, a draft project for a joint venture involving the Sandomierz glassworks, several ventures in the chemical industry, and projects in the ecological sphere.

For their part, the Japanese expressed interest in finalizing the Daihatsu-FSO automobile factory project. During a press conference in Tokyo, the president of Daihatsu presented new proposals for cooperation with the Polish automotive industry, involving a rather drastic reduction in production of the new car, at least initially. During the first phase, 6,000 Charades would be produced each year. There would be an increase to annual production of 120,000 after a few years. At first all the subassemblies would be imported from Japan. The virtue of the new proposal is the far lower cost, which means less risk for the whole investment. This factor will also help make it easier to obtain government credit.

Premier Mazowiecki has proposed that the heads of both governments appoint special emissaries. Such a move would certainly foster increased cooperation. After all, one feature of measures such as these provisions adopted at the highest levels is that it is often necessary to monitor their implementation.

## POLAND

### Crime Upswing Reported in Warsaw

90EP0314A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish  
8 Jan 90 p 8

[Article by (hel): "Dangerous Not Only at Night"]

[Text] Robberies, thefts, attacks, break-ins, killings, rapes. Virtually every day the press reports about these. One hears stories on the streetcars and buses, boarded up shop windows speak for themselves. Even in broad daylight, people do not feel safe on the streets of Warsaw, and many avoid going out after nightfall. We spoke about the crime statistics with Captain Alfred Stepinski and Lieutenant Andrzej Kuchnik from the Capital Office of Internal Affairs.

During ten months of 1989 in Warsaw and the Warsaw voivodship, 54,000 crimes were reported, but a year earlier 43,000 had been. There were, for example, more thefts and burglaries. In the disgraceful statistics, Warsaw occupies the leading position in the country, and the worst in this respect is Praga Polnoc [a district of Warsaw]. The quantity of fights, beatings, rapes, robberies, and killings also rose. The perpetrators, we have heard, are operating in an ever more audacious and brutal manner. Young people predominate among them. The majority of victims is made up of the elderly, people who are alone, people returning from work, and also those under the influence of alcohol.

The malefactors are more and more aggressive, often attacking intervening policemen. There was such an

occurrence not long ago at the Central Train Station. When the police tried to detain pickpockets, a many times more numerous "protective group" rushed in as reinforcements. The thieves escaped, because no one was eager to help the police.

Although the record of crimes indicates that their number is growing, our interviewees maintain that the numerical data does not fully reflect reality, because not all victims make reports. That is the way it is, for example, in the case of rape. It is also a common occurrence that a person befuddled by alcohol simply does not remember how it happened that he got knocked over the head or in what area he lost his money.

If one follows the statistics, one sees from them that crime detection in the capital voivodship is diminishing. However, this is occurring alongside a simultaneous, drastic cadre shortage. The capital police force currently lacks about 1,700 officers at the basic rank, above all district policemen and patrolmen. In Ursynow [a district of Warsaw], one district policeman serves a region inhabited by 15,000 people, where in accordance with norms there should be three or four district policemen. The workload in any case has no influence on salary, and so for that reason, among others, people are leaving this type of work.

Shortages of technical equipment, the frequent passivity of the witnesses of crimes, and the reluctance of people to give aid to the organs of pursuit add to the cadre problems. Thus, it happens that the criminal who is caught red-handed escapes in a little Fiat, because the policemen cannot pursue him in a crumbling Nysa police van.

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